Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience (I)
This is a version of an essay I recently published in an issue of the philosophy journal Think. It criticizes a couple of arguments made by atheist philosopher Michael Martin that God cannot be omniscient because that would conflict with some of God's other qualities (e.g., goodness, incorporeality). I review the arguments briefly and find their problems. I break the essay into two parts, each addressing a separate argument from Martin.
Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience
Is it possible for God to exist? To laymen, this query may appear rather ridiculous. 'Of course', one might say, 'many do not believe God actually exists, but surely His reality is at least possible.' For professional philosophers, however, even this bare possibility has not always been a given. Indeed, it has been alleged by significant nontheistic thinkers today and in the past that the very idea of God makes literally no sense. For these scholars, the classical concept of God is a contradiction in terms, as many of God's own attributes purportedly conflict with one another. Just as there can exist no man who is both married and a bachelor, so there can exist no person who (like God), for example, transcends the universe and yet is present everywhere in it.
But due to sophisticated refutations from theistic philosophers, such arguments, while flourishing in previous decades, have now largely fallen out of favor. Interestingly, some philosophers, reflecting on the recent resurgence of theism in the field of philosophy note that, in a certain sense, this line of argumentation ironically served to strengthen the theistic position. For the time and effort given to solving these puzzles finally produced a more refined and therefore more defensible understanding of God and His attributes.[1] Thus, we find influential atheist philosopher Michael Tooley's remark that, "arguments based upon claims that the concept of God is incoherent are [not] impressive at all."[2] Many prominent atheist thinkers would concur.[3]
Michael Martin, however, is one who would not. In his own writings on atheism, Martin has devoted ample time to the task of showing that the God of classical theism has qualities that cannot co-exist in any one being. Accordingly, God so construed is nonexistent.
Now given the hesitance of many atheist scholars to support such a thesis (as we saw above) one might assume that Martin has found something these researchers have overlooked. He perhaps has some insight that many of today's philosophers do not have. Interestingly, though, upon perusing Martin's work in this area, we find nothing of the sort. I wish to examine two of Martin's arguments against divine omniscience in particular and why they fail.
As a foundation for these arguments, Martin first defines what it means for God to be omniscient (all-knowing). In his view, to say God is omniscient is to say God has every kind of knowledge perfectly. God must not only know all truths, He must also have all procedural knowledge or know-how (e.g., knowing how to ride a bike), as well as all knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowing what it feels like to stub a toe, knowing the experience of war, etc.).[4] Unless and until, a person has all of this knowledge, he or she is not omniscient.
Now this conception of omniscience is not unproblematic, as it would be widely rejected by theologians and philosophers of religion, most of whom hold that to be omniscient, one merely has to know all truths and hold no false beliefs. This excludes the types of procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance mentioned by Martin.
But even granting Martin's account, his arguments appear flawed. With his conception in mind, he first contends that God cannot have all knowledge by acquaintance and also be morally perfect. For to have the former, God must know, for instance, what it feels like to lust after a woman or to be in a drunken stupor. But surely, says Martin, a paragon of morality like God cannot know what it is like to participate in these unethical acts and thus God cannot be omniscient in Martin's sense.[5]
As we can see, implicit in this criticism is apparently the assumption that one must participate in such acts in order to know what they feel like. God, then, must become drunk or actually lust for a woman in order to know the felt quality of things like intoxication or lust. Since a morally perfect person by definition cannot do such things, it follows that God can never know what it is like to do them.
But why must we presume that actually participating in such things is necessary to know what it feels like to so participate? Why believe that, for instance, one's being drunk is necessary to know what it is like to be drunk? Martin never comes out and addresses this point. Perhaps he is working with a certain analogy: since humans must engage in these acts in order to be acquainted with them, God does too. But surely this inference is weak. Everyone agrees that God need not acquire certain forms of knowledge that humans must acquire. For example, I have to study long and hard to master the Calculus. But God, if He exists, knows all mathematical truths eternally and essentially in virtue of His omniscience; He never has to learn mathematics. Maybe God's knowledge by acquaintance, then, is like His mathematical knowledge: He does not acquire it, but simply has it. [6] A theist who posits this can claim that God can know lust, drunkenness, and so on without ever actually being lustful or drunk.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the mere knowledge of these things taints God and makes Him immoral. A reformed alcoholic remembers (and therefore knows) what it feels like to be inebriated. But no one says that this person is immoral for having that knowledge. Rather, it is just his previous act of being inebriated that was morally wrong.
[1] See William Lane Craig, "The Coherence of Theism: Introduction," in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 203.
[2] Michael Tooley and William Lane Craig, "Debate on the Existence of God: Questions from the Audience" found online at http://spot.colorado.edu/~tooley/DebatewithCraig.html
[3] For a list of some such thinkers see, Charles Taliaferro, "The Possibility of God," in The Rationality of Theism, ed. Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 240.
[4] Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 287-288.
[5] Ibid., p. 288.
[6] Even the claim that humans must experience these acts in order to be acquainted with them is easily challenged. For instance, it seems obviously possible for God (or some supernatural person) to create an adult human who knows what it feels like to, say, run a marathon, even though he or she has never done so.
Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience
Is it possible for God to exist? To laymen, this query may appear rather ridiculous. 'Of course', one might say, 'many do not believe God actually exists, but surely His reality is at least possible.' For professional philosophers, however, even this bare possibility has not always been a given. Indeed, it has been alleged by significant nontheistic thinkers today and in the past that the very idea of God makes literally no sense. For these scholars, the classical concept of God is a contradiction in terms, as many of God's own attributes purportedly conflict with one another. Just as there can exist no man who is both married and a bachelor, so there can exist no person who (like God), for example, transcends the universe and yet is present everywhere in it.
But due to sophisticated refutations from theistic philosophers, such arguments, while flourishing in previous decades, have now largely fallen out of favor. Interestingly, some philosophers, reflecting on the recent resurgence of theism in the field of philosophy note that, in a certain sense, this line of argumentation ironically served to strengthen the theistic position. For the time and effort given to solving these puzzles finally produced a more refined and therefore more defensible understanding of God and His attributes.[1] Thus, we find influential atheist philosopher Michael Tooley's remark that, "arguments based upon claims that the concept of God is incoherent are [not] impressive at all."[2] Many prominent atheist thinkers would concur.[3]
Michael Martin, however, is one who would not. In his own writings on atheism, Martin has devoted ample time to the task of showing that the God of classical theism has qualities that cannot co-exist in any one being. Accordingly, God so construed is nonexistent.
Now given the hesitance of many atheist scholars to support such a thesis (as we saw above) one might assume that Martin has found something these researchers have overlooked. He perhaps has some insight that many of today's philosophers do not have. Interestingly, though, upon perusing Martin's work in this area, we find nothing of the sort. I wish to examine two of Martin's arguments against divine omniscience in particular and why they fail.
As a foundation for these arguments, Martin first defines what it means for God to be omniscient (all-knowing). In his view, to say God is omniscient is to say God has every kind of knowledge perfectly. God must not only know all truths, He must also have all procedural knowledge or know-how (e.g., knowing how to ride a bike), as well as all knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowing what it feels like to stub a toe, knowing the experience of war, etc.).[4] Unless and until, a person has all of this knowledge, he or she is not omniscient.
Now this conception of omniscience is not unproblematic, as it would be widely rejected by theologians and philosophers of religion, most of whom hold that to be omniscient, one merely has to know all truths and hold no false beliefs. This excludes the types of procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance mentioned by Martin.
But even granting Martin's account, his arguments appear flawed. With his conception in mind, he first contends that God cannot have all knowledge by acquaintance and also be morally perfect. For to have the former, God must know, for instance, what it feels like to lust after a woman or to be in a drunken stupor. But surely, says Martin, a paragon of morality like God cannot know what it is like to participate in these unethical acts and thus God cannot be omniscient in Martin's sense.[5]
As we can see, implicit in this criticism is apparently the assumption that one must participate in such acts in order to know what they feel like. God, then, must become drunk or actually lust for a woman in order to know the felt quality of things like intoxication or lust. Since a morally perfect person by definition cannot do such things, it follows that God can never know what it is like to do them.
But why must we presume that actually participating in such things is necessary to know what it feels like to so participate? Why believe that, for instance, one's being drunk is necessary to know what it is like to be drunk? Martin never comes out and addresses this point. Perhaps he is working with a certain analogy: since humans must engage in these acts in order to be acquainted with them, God does too. But surely this inference is weak. Everyone agrees that God need not acquire certain forms of knowledge that humans must acquire. For example, I have to study long and hard to master the Calculus. But God, if He exists, knows all mathematical truths eternally and essentially in virtue of His omniscience; He never has to learn mathematics. Maybe God's knowledge by acquaintance, then, is like His mathematical knowledge: He does not acquire it, but simply has it. [6] A theist who posits this can claim that God can know lust, drunkenness, and so on without ever actually being lustful or drunk.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the mere knowledge of these things taints God and makes Him immoral. A reformed alcoholic remembers (and therefore knows) what it feels like to be inebriated. But no one says that this person is immoral for having that knowledge. Rather, it is just his previous act of being inebriated that was morally wrong.
[1] See William Lane Craig, "The Coherence of Theism: Introduction," in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 203.
[2] Michael Tooley and William Lane Craig, "Debate on the Existence of God: Questions from the Audience" found online at http://spot.colorado.edu/~tooley/DebatewithCraig.html
[3] For a list of some such thinkers see, Charles Taliaferro, "The Possibility of God," in The Rationality of Theism, ed. Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 240.
[4] Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 287-288.
[5] Ibid., p. 288.
[6] Even the claim that humans must experience these acts in order to be acquainted with them is easily challenged. For instance, it seems obviously possible for God (or some supernatural person) to create an adult human who knows what it feels like to, say, run a marathon, even though he or she has never done so.
posted by Tom Wanchick at 12:18 AM
2 Comments:
"As we can see, implicit in this criticism is apparently the assumption that one must participate in such acts in order to know what they feel like."
Or, perhaps he is suggesting that there are immoral thoughts independent of corresponding behavior or action, as per Jesus' words in Matthew 5:27-28. That viewpoint entails that there are sins from certain forms of experiential knowledge, regardless of any outward behavior or action.
Firstly, Martin has in fact argued against the idea that our thoughts or intentions can be moral or immoral (see his *The Case Against Christianity*) and explicitly disagrees with Jesus's ethic in this regard. Thus, my interpretation of Martin appears more plausible than yours.
Secondly, God's having knowledge of what lust or envy feel like doesn't entail that he actual lusts or is envious (even if those are not manifested outwardly). All the theist has to say is that God's knowledge of these things is like a memory: He knows the feeling but even without currently participating in the actions. Similarly, a reformed alcoholic knows what it's like to be drunk, even though He hasn't drank for 38 years.
The only difference is that in God's case He never did an immoral action to begin with. Rather, He has the knowledge of the feeling simply in virtue of His omniscience.
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