Reply to Baggini (II)
Here is the second installment of my review of Julian Baggini's book, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction. Last time, I examined his arguments for naturalistic atheism. In this portion, I discuss his treatment of theistic ethics.
ATHEISM AND MORALITY
Baggini’s arguments for atheistic naturalism, thus, appear weak. I move next to his critique of theistic ethics. While he is certain that there are real moral imperatives (e.g., 'Murder is wrong'), he is equally sure that God is not their source. To show this, he poses the Euthyphro Dilemma: are certain actions good because God commands them, or does God command certain actions because they are good? Either way, theism faces difficulties. The first choice entails absurdly that God could command anything, including rape or murder, and it would be good. The second choice is similarly problematic, implying that God bases His commands on, but does not Himself determine, what is good.
But many theists circumvent these problems by adopting a third position wherein God’s moral commands are determined by His essentially good nature. With this, the dilemma dissolves: God does determine our moral law with His commands, but His commands cannot possibly be unethical as they flow necessarily from His morally perfect being.
Baggini objects, saying this too makes morality arbitrary, since rape or murder could have been good if God’s nature were different (39). But this is misleading, since God’s moral nature cannot possibly be different. Therefore, neither can morality itself, thus making it non-arbitrary.
He also contends that saying God is good in this sense implies that God fits our preconceived idea of goodness. But, allegedly, if we have moral concepts even prior to knowing God, then morality must not come from God (39). But Baggini here confuses knowing with being, as our ability to know morality without knowing God does nothing to indicate that morality can exist without God. Similarly, I can observe sunlight without observing the sun, but the latter still depends on the former for its existence.
A pertinent question arises: What does Baggini see as the foundation of morality? His answer: 'a basic concern for the welfare of others' based on our 'shared humanity' (46). Note just how arbitrary this is, implying that if humans happened to be morally unconcerned, then there would be no moral right or wrong! But let this pass. He is correct that our ethical systems should be built on the fact that humans deserve a special moral respect above that of other creatures. Ethicist Mark Linville explains that this 'is part and parcel of our most deep-seated moral beliefs.'9 Yet one never locates any explanation from Baggini of why other humans merit this respect. After all, on naturalism, he notes, 'a human being is a biological animal,' a mere survivor of the evolutionary struggle (17). But why then grant them a privileged moral status over the rest of the animal kingdom? Unlike Judeo-Christian theism, which holds that humans alone are made in God’s image and thereby reflect His inherent moral worth, evolutionary naturalism seems inconsistent with the moral principles we know to be true.
ATHEISM AND MORALITY
Baggini’s arguments for atheistic naturalism, thus, appear weak. I move next to his critique of theistic ethics. While he is certain that there are real moral imperatives (e.g., 'Murder is wrong'), he is equally sure that God is not their source. To show this, he poses the Euthyphro Dilemma: are certain actions good because God commands them, or does God command certain actions because they are good? Either way, theism faces difficulties. The first choice entails absurdly that God could command anything, including rape or murder, and it would be good. The second choice is similarly problematic, implying that God bases His commands on, but does not Himself determine, what is good.
But many theists circumvent these problems by adopting a third position wherein God’s moral commands are determined by His essentially good nature. With this, the dilemma dissolves: God does determine our moral law with His commands, but His commands cannot possibly be unethical as they flow necessarily from His morally perfect being.
Baggini objects, saying this too makes morality arbitrary, since rape or murder could have been good if God’s nature were different (39). But this is misleading, since God’s moral nature cannot possibly be different. Therefore, neither can morality itself, thus making it non-arbitrary.
He also contends that saying God is good in this sense implies that God fits our preconceived idea of goodness. But, allegedly, if we have moral concepts even prior to knowing God, then morality must not come from God (39). But Baggini here confuses knowing with being, as our ability to know morality without knowing God does nothing to indicate that morality can exist without God. Similarly, I can observe sunlight without observing the sun, but the latter still depends on the former for its existence.
A pertinent question arises: What does Baggini see as the foundation of morality? His answer: 'a basic concern for the welfare of others' based on our 'shared humanity' (46). Note just how arbitrary this is, implying that if humans happened to be morally unconcerned, then there would be no moral right or wrong! But let this pass. He is correct that our ethical systems should be built on the fact that humans deserve a special moral respect above that of other creatures. Ethicist Mark Linville explains that this 'is part and parcel of our most deep-seated moral beliefs.'9 Yet one never locates any explanation from Baggini of why other humans merit this respect. After all, on naturalism, he notes, 'a human being is a biological animal,' a mere survivor of the evolutionary struggle (17). But why then grant them a privileged moral status over the rest of the animal kingdom? Unlike Judeo-Christian theism, which holds that humans alone are made in God’s image and thereby reflect His inherent moral worth, evolutionary naturalism seems inconsistent with the moral principles we know to be true.
posted by Tom Wanchick at 6:41 PM
14 Comments:
I'm not sure I understand the third option. One way of understanding part of the problem for the theological grounding of ethics is that if one wanted to defend, say, a divine command theory, is that in order for morality to be the sort of thing whose fundamental features can be fixed by divine will, its features must be malleable. But with malleability comes the possibility that murder could have been okay. Moreover, there quite literally could have been no reason to make murder wrong since there is no further normative feature independent of a divine affection or whim to make it wrong.
Now, maybe this idea that God's essence or whatever is the source of morality is different from the divine command theory, but I'd like to know what distinguishes it from this more familiar view and how specifically this change leads to a solution.
Even if there is a third option, wouldn't the proponent of a theological grounding of morality have to say that if there were no God, there would be no moral reasons not to murder? Yes, I know, God is supposed to be necessary so this is a counterfactual with a necessarily false antecedent according to the theist, but the fact that we cannot imagine how a world could have had this physical, psychological profile with different moral facts is some reason to think that these facts alone should suffice to determine which acts are right and didn't need some divine source. So do you think you can coherently conceive of a world with just this physical/psychological profile where murder is okay?
Last question, I promise. Suppose you became an atheist. Unlikely, but humor me. Do you now think that you would thereby lose every reason to do good deeds? If I were to come to think (rightly or wrongly) that the economy completely crashed next month, I now think that I would be completely irrational if I still sought out money. So, do you now think in a similar vein that you'd be unreasonable to extend yourself for the people around you if you were to later be tricked into being an atheist?
Great post! Now, I won't step into your discussion, but I came across your blog and was uber impressed, for you seem to have much the same interests as I (Ultimate Fighting and Apologetics--though my blog is primarily reserved for apologetics). I think I’ll stick around and be a frequent comment-dropper if you don’t mind. Feel free to visit me at www.DoxazoTheos.blogspot.com
Clayton,
Thanks a lot for your comments. I hope you'll continue to visit my blog.
Divine Command Theory differs from the one I mention only in that it is not ULTIMATELY God's commands that determine right and wrong. Rather, right and wrong simply flow from His nature. It's true that moral laws are comprised of God's commands, but His commands flow from His nature; He has no choice what to command; His nature is the foundation.
Yes, my view does commit us to saying if God doesn't exist, then no morality exists. But that does not at all contradict the fact that I can't conceive of a world where murder is ok.
The reason murder can't be ok is because murder is the unjustified killing of PERSONS (it's okay to kill cows, not humans). And there is no possible world where it is okay to kill persons. But then the question becomes why should we consider humans to be morally valuable persons? On evolutionary naturalism, aren't we just animals? (Baggini says so.) But then, on naturalism, killing a human is not murder, since it's not killing a person.
Thus, my Moral Argument is based on this insight: if there are no persons, there is no morality (we would all be animals, which it is okay to kill). But without God, there is no personhood. Therefore, without God, there is no morality.
Chad,
Thanks for the kind comments. That's awesome that you're into Ultimate Fighting and apologetics like I am. What are the odds?
Definitely keep an eye on my blog; there'll be some cool things to come. I welcome your comments.
And I'll be sure to check out your blog too.
"Even if there is a third option, wouldn't the proponent of a theological grounding of morality have to say that if there were no God, there would be no moral reasons not to murder? . . . the fact that we cannot imagine how a world could have had this physical, psychological profile with different moral facts is some reason to think that these facts alone should suffice to determine which acts are right and didn't need some divine source. So do you think you can coherently conceive of a world with just this physical/psychological profile where murder is okay?"
I'm not so sure it's impossible to conceive of that alternate kind of world, in which murder is okay, though it does not have this physical/psychological profile. When I read the committed materialists, and try to follow their conclusions to their logical end, it seems that by their systems this should be a world where murder is okay. Under this worldview, the world of humans should be morally equivalent to that of animals--and ethics is not on their minds at all.
The very concept of "okay" (of a moral right or wrong) seems meaningless in such a system. This is what Tom Wanchick is saying, I believe.
Thus we have the ethical argument for God: if we hope to preserve our belief in right and wrong upon solid foundations, we must have a personal God to rest it on.
Again, "the fact that we cannot imagine how a world could have had this physical, psychological profile with different moral facts is some reason to think that these facts alone should suffice to determine which acts are right and didn't need some divine source."
This does indicate that we have access to at least an approximate definition of right and wrong, without consciously resorting to a deity for it. If we try, though, to move from definition to explanation without deity, that's where we run into trouble; for though we basically know about right and wrong, without a personal God the rational foundations for right and wrong are weak to nonexistent.
Toms,
I find this highly unintuitive. Tom W, your answer seemed to be that your view differs from the divine command theory in two respects. First, divine commands are not given priority over divine nature. Second, we matter morally because we are like a divine thing in certain intrinsic respects. But this is of course just what materialists say in a sense. We matter morally because like Gods are thought to be we are rational beings. We matter morally because we are capable of suffering. It seems you are saying essentially that the wrongness of murder can be explained by the characteristics that are distinctive of humans and distinguishes us from non-human animals. This is pretty much how the atheist and agnostic would go about explaining the wrongness of murder. So maybe you save the theological grounding of ethics, but I'm at an utter loss as to what distinguishes it from non-theological approaches.
When you ask 'On evolutionary naturalism aren't we just animals?' I'm tempted to ask what kingdom you think homo sapiens should be located in. We might be men, not mice, but we clearly are not mushrooms or ferns either. [Tongue in cheek].
Perhaps you think that EN cannot explain why we matter more than other animals. Well first, EN is not an ethical theory but a philosophico-scientific story about how life came to be in its present form. It doesn't explain supply and demand either but it isn't to be faulted for that. As for an ethicist being hamstrung by EN, I don't see it. Thanks to evolution, people are capable of rational thought and are capable of feeling pleasure and pain. That's why they matter. If we had ended up like sponges incapable of any form of thought, we wouldn't matter all that much. The causal mechanisms by which we ended up in our present state differs on your theory and mine, but we both agree that given where we are, we matter. And it isn't as if you have an explanation for why being a rational being should make you matter morally. So why do I need one. we are on par, right?
Tom G,
You say that the materialist should say that we are the moral equivalents of animals and for that reason shouldn't matter morally. HUH? As a materialist who thinks that people tend not to take animal suffering seriously enough, I suppose I am tempted to modus tollens when you modus ponens. Animals matter morally because they are capable of suffering. They have an interest in not suffering and decent people do not inflict suffering upon them. If it took theology to 'figure out' that you shouldn't be cruel to animals, that is quite simply chilling.
The materialist does not have to say in saying that animals matter morally speaking that they are the equivalents of persons b/c the interests of persons include things that animals have no interests in thanks to their capacities.
I would be very interested to learn why either of you think that the justification or foundation of morality requires an appeal to the divine. Myself, I can't see how the divine could make a difference and I'm still somewhat puzzled by what Tom W's answer is. But I'm far more puzzled by Tom G's suggestion that you'll ultimately need God to explain why morality matters.
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Clayton,
Thanks for the comments. Fortunately, seem to admit that my response to the old Euthyphro-dilemma solves that problem. That's progress, at least.
You now state that naturalists and theists both regard humans as morally valuable for the same reason, i.e., because humans are rational and can suffer.
But this has at least two problems. Firstly, it implies that the more "rational" you are, the more morally valuable you are. That in turn means that human babies or the mentally retarded or the stupid are less valuable than normal adults. But any ethical theory espousing that has to be false. Secondly, it implies that humans that are, say, in a coma or unconscious lack moral value because they are "irrational" at that point. That too is absurd.
Actually, the moral properties that humans have cannot be reduced to other properties (e.g., rationality, etc.). They are simply sui generis properties. But what is their explanation?
These are certainly not properties of matter. So how did they ever come about? Why do only humans have them, instead of other creatures?
This mystery seems easily answered by the biblical account that has been there all along: humans are endowed by God with such properties, since they are made in His image and thus reflect his inherent moral worth.
Do you have a better answer?
Tom,
I don't think I think your view solves the Euthyphro b/c I really can't make heads or tails of it. You seem to agree that in virtue of the characteristics we share w/the divine we have moral status and then turn around and say that it takes extra properties over and above the physical and psychological properties we have to give us moral status.
One thing from your last remark struck me as odd. I don't know many naturalists who advocate reductions of properties or what might be called 'type' identities. The reason is essentially that being such fine grained entities, it is rare that our predicates would pick out the same property. However, given that, it seems most naturalists are happy with a supervenience formulation of naturalism that allows that moral properties are perhaps distinct but far from sui generis since you cannot get a moral difference without an underlying non-moral difference.
If you thought that moral properties were sui generis in this way, presumably you think you CAN get a moral difference without any other difference to account for it. But then you are in fact back to the old bad view that holds that holding everything else fixed, murder could have been okay.
As for the criticism of the appeal to rationality and sentience, I nowhere said nor did I mean to imply that with greater rationality comes greater moral status. In fact, I'd reject that. (See, we agree!) Of course, I'd also reject the suggestion that when you aren't using your rational abilities because you are asleep you lose your moral standing. Being asleep does nothing to alter your possession of a capacity for rationality, it does nothing to alter the interests that we think matter most to people. If this WERE the view, I could see why one would reject it. I'm at a loss as to why you think this is a view anyone holds or is compelled to.
The last remark of yours contains what appears to be a significant slip. Earlier you suggested that in creating our physical and mental aspects, God needn't have bestowed moral worth on us. I can't imagine how we could have refrained from doing so any more than he could have given us bodies without shape. So whereas you say that the biblical view is he then performed a third act and gave us moral worth (but without changing us?), I say that act 3 was completed at the end of act 2. I don't see that this conflicts with any 'biblical' view but if it does, the biblical view has weird metaphysics.
"God's nature is essentially prfectly good" can be understood in two ways:
1. God merely exemplifies goodness, as do we; but he exemplifies it essentially to the highest degree.
2. God does not merely exemplify goodness but rather is goodness itself.
The first option seems to imply that, though God is perfectly good, the good itself lies outside Him. This is unacceptable for it makes God subordinate to a second, distinct thing.
So then we must assume that God is goodness itself. This was the view taken by Thomas, Augustine and others. But this seems deeply mysterious to me. I don't know how it could be possible that a personal being could be goodness itself. I know well enough what it means to say that a person exemplifies goodness, for we have numerous examples. But a person being goodness is something else entirely.
Moreover, it seems that we have to say as well that God does not merely exemplify power but is power itself, that he not merely exemplify knowledge, but is knowledge itself, etc. But then we have said that God is goodness, power, knowledge, etc. from which it follows that goodness is power is knowledge etc. This is deeply mysterious. Would this not imply that all power is good? Surely that's false. The power exercised by a despot is evil.
Clayton,
Your typical naturalistic ethic just seems obviously implausible.
It says, basically, that humans are morally special among the other animals because they are "rational" and thus can experience pain or suffering.
But, firstly, this never addresses the question: Why should we not inflict pain on humans? Notice that animals can feel pain too, but we always inflict pain on them (e.g., in scientific experiments; while killing them for food) and it is not immoral. So why should we not do the same for humans? Naturalism says humans are animals, so why the different treatment?
Secondly, as a thought experiment, imagine a dilemma where one has a choice of either pummeling an ape with a sledgehammer vs. doing so to a human. Also, imagine that both feel pain with equal vividness. Which one should we hit? Surely, the ape if we have to choose one. But why? It will experience the same pain as the human. The only reason I can think of is that the human has an intrinsic moral value not had by the ape.
Thirdly, what about cases where there is no pain or suffering involved. What if we have the choice of poisoning an ape or poisoning a human? Moreover, it will kill the victim without any pain or suffering involved. Which one should we poison if we must? Surely, the ape. But that can't because it feels less pain, for there is no pain involved. The only reason appears to be that humans have special moral value.
But on naturalism where does moral value come from? Naturalism implies materialism and moral properties just are not properties of matter. The source must be another morally valuable person who created us with that same quality. And that is simply God.
Franklin,
Thanks for your comments. Welcome to my blog.
My position is that what we call "good" is just the actions God Himself does or would do and thus commands us to do.
But that doesn't imply that there is a distinct "good" that God follows. Rather, He sets the precendent via His nature.
In short, I'm saying God's nature is such that everything He wills and does is in accord with what we call 'good.' We know what is good via intuition and such and we can know this even prior to knowing that God is its source. Thus, it makes sense to reflect and say God is perfectly good.
Similarly, I can know what brightness is before I see the sun. Thus, when I see the sun I say how bright it is. But that doesn't prevent the sun from being the source of brightness all along.
"Your typical naturalistic ethic just seems obviously implausible."
This is not a very good way to argue. (Cf. David Lewis on "incredulous stares.")
"The reason murder can't be ok is because murder is the unjustified killing of PERSONS (it's okay to kill cows, not humans). And there is no possible world where it is okay to kill persons."
I take it, then, Tom, that you are not a biblical theist, since the Bible depicts God commanding the killing of persons on multiple occasions, including women, children, and the unborn. If "there is no possible world where it is okay to kill persons," then such commands are commands to commit evil acts.
Perhaps you will revise your second statement to be qualified like the first by adding "unjustifiably" before "kill"; in that case if you endorse all God-commanded killing as justifiable, we'd have to argue about the specific justifications. (In my opinion, the Old Testament depicts God as the source of good and evil and as being in no need of justification, with argument to that effect in the book of Job. I reject the soundness of that argument.)
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