Is Apologetics Combative?
Having studied apologetics for around 8 years now, I've continually seen apologists and authors announce in their writings that in doing apologetics we shouldn't see things as "us vs. them". When we encounter unbelievers and discuss or debate with them the intellectual merits of Christianity, we should see ourselves as trying to win a convert for Christ, not as an enemy to be defeated. I've heard this sort of outlook from Hank Hanegraaff (The Bible Answer Man) and R. Douglas Geivett, for example.
But I just can't get myself to agree. For instance, in confronting an avowed skeptic of Christianity who in effect challenges the truth of our faith important things are stake. Firstly, the person is in effect trying to show you why your belief in Christ should be abandoned. But to abandon Christ is evil and thus the skeptic here is trying to perform an evil act on you, so to say. But how can one defend against an evil act if he doesn't combat it? We can't simply see this as a friendly exchange of ideas, for eternal destiny is at stake. Evil has to be combatted in order to be stopped and doing apologetics is one way of doing so.
Secondly, skeptics often wish to sway other people away from the faith. This too is of course evil. Thus, in doing apologetics and arguing against the skeptic here we are, in effect, fighting for eternal destiny. Again, this seems incompatible with a view whereby we're somehow sympathetic to our skeptic friend and want to stay friends so long as we don't come off as combative. Better to be combative than to lose souls to evildoers.
Lastly, Jesus Himself seemed combative in His dealings with detractors such as the Pharisees. Jesus confronted these false teachers in the intellectual arena and did so with vigor and urgency. He wasn't overly nice or empathetic: He sought to stamp out evil and hatred for God where He found it and before it evaded the masses further. We also see Jesus overturning the temple marketplace and calling Herod a "fox". Jesus was by no means pacifistic when it came to apologetic encounters.
Apologetics ultimately reduces to a battle of good vs. evil: a battle to save men from the evil forces (whether they be human or Satanic) who wish to turn him against God. And the battle against evil is always combative.
But I just can't get myself to agree. For instance, in confronting an avowed skeptic of Christianity who in effect challenges the truth of our faith important things are stake. Firstly, the person is in effect trying to show you why your belief in Christ should be abandoned. But to abandon Christ is evil and thus the skeptic here is trying to perform an evil act on you, so to say. But how can one defend against an evil act if he doesn't combat it? We can't simply see this as a friendly exchange of ideas, for eternal destiny is at stake. Evil has to be combatted in order to be stopped and doing apologetics is one way of doing so.
Secondly, skeptics often wish to sway other people away from the faith. This too is of course evil. Thus, in doing apologetics and arguing against the skeptic here we are, in effect, fighting for eternal destiny. Again, this seems incompatible with a view whereby we're somehow sympathetic to our skeptic friend and want to stay friends so long as we don't come off as combative. Better to be combative than to lose souls to evildoers.
Lastly, Jesus Himself seemed combative in His dealings with detractors such as the Pharisees. Jesus confronted these false teachers in the intellectual arena and did so with vigor and urgency. He wasn't overly nice or empathetic: He sought to stamp out evil and hatred for God where He found it and before it evaded the masses further. We also see Jesus overturning the temple marketplace and calling Herod a "fox". Jesus was by no means pacifistic when it came to apologetic encounters.
Apologetics ultimately reduces to a battle of good vs. evil: a battle to save men from the evil forces (whether they be human or Satanic) who wish to turn him against God. And the battle against evil is always combative.
posted by Tom Wanchick at 2:48 PM
14 Comments:
Tom: "But I just can't get myself to agree. For instance, in confronting an avowed skeptic of Christianity who in effect challenges the truth of our faith important things are stake."
If the Christian god's "plan" is real, unalterable and unstoppable, how can anything be at stake? To say that something is at stake, is to say that there is a possibility that it will be impeded, harmed or destroyed. But with all the amazing attributes that Christians assign to their god and its "plan," how could this be?
Tom: "Firstly, the person is in effect trying to show you why your belief in Christ should be abandoned."
Well, if you truly believe that what you claim to believe is so true, why become so defensive about the matter? If you really think what Christianity (the version to which you adhere anyway) teaches is true, what's the big deal? Doesn't your worldview teach that it's up to your god who believes and who doesn't? Or do you think individuals really have a choice in the matter? As for myself, I will not say I believe something that I don't believe, and I will not say that something is true when I know it isn't. Do you feel threatened by someone else's honesty?
Tom: "But to abandon Christ is evil"
Let's try not to overstate the matter. I personally know many people who walked away from Christianity and went on to have much more productive and fulfilling lives. What "evil" did they do? Perhaps what you mean by 'evil' is not what I would mean by this term. I'd like to see the bible's definition and to know how that definition would be vaidated. I would also like to know what makes something objectively evil according to the Christian worldview. Perhaps you could devote a blog entry to this topic.
Tom: "and thus the skeptic here is trying to perform an evil act on you, so to say."
Muslim suicide bombers would say the same thing about non-Muslims who would try to persuade them from abandoning their primitive worldview. The non-Muslims are simply "presupposed" to be "evil," by virtue of the mere fact that they are not Muslims. And just as Christians want to view non-Christians who contend against Christianity as persons intending "to perform an evil act," Muslims want to view non-Muslims who contend against Islam as persons intending "to perform an evil act." The skeptic likewise probably looks at the history of both religions and considers them evil based on the evidence.
Tom: "But how can one defend against an evil act if he doesn't combat it?"
There is a such thing as "passive resistance," which some may argue is ineffective. But this is supposed to be a spiritual war, right? But if what the New Testament teaches is true, then non-believers have already been defeated, for it holds that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit" (I Cor. 2:14). If anything, "war" is really not the right word, because war consists of two opposed sides which can participate in hostilities. But if the warfare is "spiritual" in nature, and "the natural man" does not have the "spiritual" tools necessary to participate in the war's battles, then it would really be a matter of divide and conquer, like a battalion of M1 Abrams battle tanks rolling into a 4th century village. How could the villagers resist? "If God be for us, who can be against us?" (Rom. 8:31) That is, if Christianity were really true, believers would not perceive non-believers to be such a threat. (But obviously they do.)
Tom: "We can't simply see this as a friendly exchange of ideas….."
This is how I would expect a religious man to consider the debate if he recognized deep down that his religious beliefs are not true. If he his beliefs were true and he could show this rationally, then I'd expect that he would have genuine confidence in them, and that he would welcome a friendly exchange of ideas to demonstrate their truth.
Tom: "Evil has to be combatted in order to be stopped and doing apologetics is one way of doing so."
What evil have you "stopped" today, Tom? And with what tools? With the weak and ineffectual apologetic arguments? They don't prove what believers want them to prove - they only reinforce the believer's investment in an irrational paradigm. Besides, I thought Jesus said "resist not evil" (Mt. 5:39). Why stop evil if it's all part of "God's plan" anyway? By taking it upon yourself to combat the "evil unbelievers," you're performatively suggesting that you have a better plan for the current state of affairs than your god has, for you're acting to change the way your god has arranged things.
Tom: "skeptics often wish to sway other people away from the faith."
Yes, some do. And those who have accepted a set of beliefs on faith will tend to become quite defensive. But typically the case has been that believers are the ones going door-to-door looking to change others. They're out on the streets handing out bible tracts, proactively (sometimes even aggressively) promoting their faith-based beliefs to complete strangers, so I'd say these people are essentially looking for the trouble they complain about so much. To say that the efforts of skeptics "to sway other people away from the faith" are "evil," implies that the proselytizers are in effect out looking for evil, or at least proactively putting them in a position to encounter it.
Tom: "Thus, in doing apologetics and arguing against the skeptic here we are, in effect, fighting for eternal destiny."
I suppose apologists would be motivated to see things in this way, but their own doctrines explicitly say that their god has got "eternal destiny" already sealed up. So this "fighting for eternal destiny" is not only superfluous (for it is not needed), it is vain (for according to the teaching, man's efforts will not change what the Christian god has already planned).
Tom: "Again, this seems incompatible with a view whereby we're somehow sympathetic to our skeptic friend and want to stay friends so long as we don't come off as combative. Better to be combative than to lose souls to evildoers."
Statements like this suggest that the "evildoers" have the advantage and are set to prevail, and that what is needed is effort to minimize further losses. I know of no other way to understand this statement than to see it as taking for granted that further losses are practically inevitable.
Tom: "Lastly, Jesus Himself seemed combative in His dealings with detractors such as the Pharisees."
One could cite biblical examples to support either the combative or the pacificistic approach to things, since as with so many things it touches, there is little uniformity on this matter. Those who are hawkish about military exploits, for instance, could find plenty of verses to support their perspective, while those who would consider themselves conscientious objectors could find plenty of passages which support their preference for passivity. One could reply to your citation of Jesus' dealings with the Pharisees here by pointing out that the Pharisees were religious leaders in a position of power, while the average skeptic Joe is just typically someone who tends to mind his own business, going about his life according to his own judgments rather than someone else's. This in itself may in fact be perceived as a threat to the believer, so he'll seek to lift bible passages in such a way that they seem to justify his preference for combativeness.
Tom: "Jesus confronted these false teachers in the intellectual arena and did so with vigor and urgency."
In the case of his exchanges with Pharisees, he was in effect debating with other theists. In such a way the biblical record leaves open to our own imaginations how the Jesus figure of the gospels would have conducted himself in a debate with those who recognize the fundamental errors of god-belief as such.
Tom: "He wasn't overly nice or empathetic: He sought to stamp out evil and hatred for God where He found it and before it evaded the masses further. We also see Jesus overturning the temple marketplace and calling Herod a 'fox'. Jesus was by no means pacifistic when it came to apologetic encounters."
Given such examples, which show little concern for observing other people's right to property (some Christians I know deny man's right to property), it's interesting that we don't find many Christians today going into places which they consider evil (such as abortion clinics) to do mischief. Oh, wait, there are many who do exactly that. I suppose they're just being consistent with their worldview presuppositions.
Tom: "Apologetics ultimately reduces to a battle of good vs. evil: a battle to save men from the evil forces (whether they be human or Satanic) who wish to turn him against God. And the battle against evil is always combative."
Again, I thought Jesus said "resist not evil," and if it's the Christian god that decides who will be saved and who will be damned, then the apologist's efforts would be irrelevant. Would the apologist's failure to "combat the evildoers" somehow impede the Christian god's "plan"? Or, are the apologist's own actions necessary to for this "plan" to prevail (thus making it contingent on human choices and actions)?
Best regards,
Dawson
Well said, Dawson.
Dawson,
Your posts always seem to combine two of the most irritating elements when it comes to writing - verbosity and poor argumentation - to the point where your posts are nigh unreadable.
Furthermore, to add insult to injury, you have a sychophantic fan club.
Let me demonstrate how poor your argumnetation is.
You claim, for instance, that the fact that God has a plan, fixed and unalterable, from all eternity prohibits anything from being at stake. For something to be at stake, you add, is for the possibilty of harm and alteration to to exist.
Here is one response: you equivocate with the word "possibility". It seems plausible that there are (at least) 2 way "possibility" could be taken here: epistemologically or metaphysically. The former being held to refer to what we KNOW to be necesary and/or possible, the latter refering to the ACTUAL modal status of existing things.
Bearing in mind this distinction, things are at stake for us simply because we do not know God's plan. There is, from out point of view, the (epistemic) possibilty of things going wrong. Nothing is at stake from God's point of view of course, but, not having exhuastive access to God's point of view, I am in ignorance about the immediate future and must act as best I can, recognising that my acts can play a causal role in bringing about God's plan.
What else did you expect?
Did you expect us to commit the modal fallacy and argue "whatever happens will happen necessarily, therefore, I might as well not do anything"?? I think any determinist who argues like that will come to a sticky end.
So when you say "Why stop evil if it's all part of "God's plan" anyway?" the simple rejoinder is that our stopping evil is also part of God's plan. Unless, of course, you have an argument proving that we are not in God's plan, and that it isn't God's plan for us to act to change things?
Here's another example.
Why are defensive about Christian belief, you ask, if we think its true? Strange question. We are defensive about it BECAUSE we think its true! Or don't you think that the truth should be defended?
Yet another:
You argue that Tom's contention that we can't see this as a friendly exchange of ideas is evidence that he has no confidence in his beliefs! Since when did the denial that apologetics in non-antagonistic preclude confidence in ones beliefs? Or their truth? Back this up. And read up on the genetic fallacy.
And to clear up some loose ends:
You want the Bible's definition of evil? Morality supervenes (I think it has to supervene for fear of the naturalistic fallacy) on the commands and/or nature of God - see, for example, the Ten Commandments.
What validates this definition? Definitions are self-validating.
And as for comparisons with mad muslims, I think (at least i think i think) the Bible no longer sanctions the execution of unbelievers. (Luckily for you Dawson... Guess i'll just have to throw these letter bombs away...)
Yours,
MJ
P.S. Isn't Dawson the name of the bumbling fat mouse assistant in "Basil the Great Mouse Detective"?
Whether or not apologetics is combative.. apolegetics is futile.
http://hereswhyurwrong.blogspot.com/
Dawson,
MJ: "Your posts always seem to combine two of the most irritating elements when it comes to writing - verbosity and poor argumentation - to the point where your posts are nigh unreadable."
Then stop reading them.
MJ: "Furthermore, to add insult to injury, you have a sychophantic fan club."
I didn't know that I had a fan club to begin with. And how could it be considered an insult if I did have a fan club? Anyway, is this statement supposed to be taken in contrast to the "poor argumentation" of which you accuse me?
MJ: "Let me demonstrate how poor your argumnetation is."
You don’t succeed in demonstrating "how poor [my] argumentation is," because you don't deal with any argument that I may have presented in my response to Tom's blog. All you do is offer a red herring in place of addressing the questions that I have asked the author of the post to which I was responding. Perhaps you have no answer but to accuse me of fallacies you imagine me committing.
You say that, due to this imagined distinction, "things are at stake for us simply because we do not know God's plan." What "things" specifically are at stake? You don't specify, apparently preferring the confort of the indefinite. At any rate, if you don't know "God's plan," then you don't know what will happen next. And since your worldview embraces the cartoon universe premise, you inadvertently acknowledge that you have no basis for confidence in inductive inferences about the world (since you don't know whether "God's plan" entails the gravity of the earth holding from moment to moment, or daisies suddenly reciting Mao's sayings in Finnish translation, etc.). So much for Christianity offering a solution to "the problem of induction."
MJ: "You claim, for instance, that the fact that God has a plan, fixed and unalterable, from all eternity prohibits anything from being at stake."
Just to be clear, I nowhere affirm "the fact that God has a plan." Arbitrary notions by their very nature are necessarily contra-factual.
MJ: "For something to be at stake, you add, is for the possibilty of harm and alteration to to exist. Here is one response: you equivocate with the word 'possibility'. It seems plausible that there are (at least) 2 way "possibility" could be taken here: epistemologically or metaphysically. The former being held to refer to what we KNOW to be necesary and/or possible, the latter refering to the ACTUAL modal status of existing things."
This is simply a red herring for it only serves to obfuscate the issue. What's more is that you assume a distinction between epistemological possibility and metaphysical possibility, and I know of no such distinction because according to my worldview 'possibility' is an epistemological concept (since it has to do with the degree of our knowledge of things, it does not have meaning independent of the processes by which we make estimations). So you beg the question simply by introducing this (thus committing two errors in one fell swoop). For that matter, I'd like to know where the bible endorses the alleged distinction between "epistemological possibility" and "metaphysical possibility." Most likely, these notions have been borrowed from secular philosophers and recruited for the purpose of blurring more fundamental distinctions.
MJ: "Bearing in mind this distinction, things are at stake for us simply because we do not know God's plan."
Your lack of knowledge of "God's plan" is irrelevant, especially if it's part of that "plan" that you remain ignorant of it. And if the "plan" entailed that you know it, how could you fail to know it? Blank out. So if you affirm that there is such a "plan" and yet you don't know the "plan," then it must be part of the "plan" that you don't know it, since it is supposed to be all-encompassing. It does not follow from your ignorance of this "plan" that something would therefore be at stake, for one of the qualities ascribed to this "plan" is that it cannot fail. So given such certainty of ultimate outcomes, there could ultimately be nothing at stake.
MJ: "There is, from out [our?] point of view, the (epistemic) possibilty of things going wrong."
But from your point of view, "God controls whatsoever comes to pass" (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160), so what could possibly "go wrong"? You nowhere specify anything that could "go wrong," and that doesn't surprise me. "Go wrong" is simply a point of view, one which at the very least presupposes that ultimate outcomes have not been guaranteed in advance, and this is anathema to the view that there is a divine "plan" which accounts for any possible or actual state of affairs. The distinction you tried to wedge between "epistemological possibility" and "metaphysical possibility" does nothing to overcome this internal tension. It simply shows that you're trying to have your cake, and eat it, too. Take for instance "Adam's fall." Did the Christian god's creation "go wrong"? Well, if it did, whose fault is that? The creature's fault? Not if it's the case that "God controls whatsoever comes to pass." And if it's not the case that "God controls whatsoever comes to pass," then where does that put "God's plan"? It's just another fallible plan just like any plan that you or I could come up with, and thus offers no certainty of outcomes and fails to lend itself as the rationalizing device your worldview so desperately needs.
MJ: "Nothing is at stake from God's point of view of course,"
Um... that was my point. Perhaps you believe your point of view prevails over your god's point of view? What happened to faith?
MJ: "but, not having exhuastive access to God's point of view, I am in ignorance about the immediate future and must act as best I can, recognising that my acts can play a causal role in bringing about God's plan."
Given your presuppositions, your actions will play a part in "God's plan" whether you know it or not. So your knowledge is irrelevant. In fact, it's the lack of knowledge of "God's plan" that gives it value to apologetics, for since nothing is known about it, it can be said to "account for" anything that happens. So, given your presuppositions, you have already stipulated that whatever actions you take, knowingly or not, will be in accordance with this "plan" which is, after all, as you pointed out, a secret to everyone but the god which allegedly authored it and set it into motion. The notion of "God's plan" is simply a rationalization of whatever happens, particularly to accommodate the problem of evil.
MJ: "Did you expect us to commit the modal fallacy and argue 'whatever happens will happen necessarily, therefore, I might as well not do anything'??"
No, I didn't expect this - that would be too consistent, and I don't know Christians for consistently following the implications of their worldview's affirmations.
MJ: "I think any determinist who argues like that will come to a sticky end."
Of course, since determinism is invalid, and it cannot avoid such conclusions if followed to its logical end. But when you have a worldview which affirms that “God controls whatsoever comes to pass,” how is this not a form of determinism? Bahnsen, for instance, writes of "God’s all-controlling sovereignty" (Van Til’s Apologetic: Reading & Analysis, p. 122n.106). Such notions clearly state that the events that make up the course of human history occur in conformity with some overarching scheme - a "plan" - which has choreographed in advance every detail so that all events unfold as desired. Now, it may be the case that you worship a disorganized god which has such control but which is just winging it as it goes, no clear end in mind, just haphazardly wishing everything that happens in a most arbitrary manner. But this isn't what most Christians want to say about their god. Rather, they claim that everything - down to the very hairs on our heads - has been predetermined by this invisible magic being they want to worship.
In my response to Tom's blog, I asked "Would the apologist's failure to 'combat the evildoers' somehow impede the Christian god's 'plan'?" But no answer to this question has been forthcoming. But I think it's pretty simple to understand: if nothing can stop "God's plan" from proceeding as divinely intended, you might as well sit on your hands and do nothing. In fact, given the arbitrariness of the Christian worldview and its obvious commitment to metaphysical determinism, you have all you need to justify the choice to sit on your hands and do nothing, and to rationalize this decision as being in accordance to "God's plan," since, as you admit, you are ignorant of what this "plan" entails from moment to moment. And since it is not your own choices and actions which make this "plan" a reality, your own choices are ultimately irrelevant. So you really have no justification to do anything but sit on your hands and do nothing, since it's not your show. After all, this "plan" could quite as easily have excluded you from existing in the first place. So on your view, should you be consistent with it, you yourself are irrelevant. And so are concepts like 'good' and 'evil', for no matter how much evil happens, it's all for the good in the end anyway, right? (As Bahnsen puts it, "God has a morally sufficient reason to allow the evil that exists.") I'm glad these aren't my problems.
MJ: "So when you say 'Why stop evil if it's all part of 'God's plan' anyway?' the simple rejoinder is that our stopping evil is also part of God's plan."
Well, if evil were stopped every time it started to occur, I suppose you might be able to produce evidence to support this. But even a cursory glance through history will show that evil is stopped only by the effort of those who chose to oppose it, and that usually only happens long after that evil has caused significant irreversible damage. And that's likely due to the fact that many decision-makers are conflicted on whether or not evil should be opposed in the first place. One will not choose to oppose evil if he takes seriously a worldview which instructs him to "resist not evil" (Mt. 5:39). At best, this could only mean that "God's plan" entails that men who would otherwise choose to oppose evil should refrain from doing so (since they're commanded to "resist not evil"), and allegedly the invisible magic being of Christianity will handle things itself (and not necessarily on their behalf, since the bible nowhere commits the Christian god to bestowing such favor). After all, what Christian would say that his god needs human assistance? I suppose this would also mean that Hitler's extermination of Europe's Jews is not considered "evil" by Christians, for their god did not stop it. On the contrary, those who stopped it are men who ascribed to a view of the world which encourages them to resist evil and gives clear principles in understanding why evil should be stopped. And that couldn't be Christianity, for Christianity is clear in its teaching that men "resist not evil."
MJ: "Unless, of course, you have an argument proving that we are not in God's plan, and that it isn't God's plan for us to act to change things?"
There is no need to produce an argument to disprove arbitrary claims, for their own arbitrariness is sufficient to show that they cannot be true and that to accept them as true is irrational. All I'm doing is pointing out how the apologist's own defenses conflict with the clear implications of the views they want to defend.
MJ: "Why are [we?] defensive about Christian belief, you ask, if we think its true? Strange question. We are defensive about it BECAUSE we think its true!"
I would expect apologist to offer such naïve responses on such topics, so you're right on schedule with this. But, as I also expected, you miss the point since you so carelessly drop the context of the teachings of your worldview, which I pinpointed in my response to Tom. Perhaps you just aren't aware that you've missed it?
MJ: "Or don't you think that the truth should be defended?"
Given my "non-Christian presuppositions," I would in general think that truth should be defended. But if I took seriously a worldview which affirms things like "God controls whatsoever comes to pass" and that everything that happens does so according to a "plan" whose ultimate outcome is that "the Truth" will prevail, I could not avoid adopting a completely defeatist attitude about existence, since nothing I could do would have any meaning anyway. According to this view, everything that's going to happen has already been determined, so my own choices and actions would be irrelevant. By contrast, on the premises of my worldview, man's choices and actions do make a difference. So to the extent to which the Christian apologist would affirm that man's choices and actions have any efficacy in reality whatsoever, it's clear to me that he's borrowing from my this-worldly worldview and ignoring the teachings of Christianity. That's nothing new, of course.
MJ: "You argue that Tom's contention that we can't see this as a friendly exchange of ideas is evidence that he has no confidence in his beliefs!"
Yep, that's my take on things. Indeed, if he really believed that "the Truth" were on his side, what would he have to lose by exchanging ideas in a friendly manner? You've not addressed this question. In fact, by explicitly discouraging the view that a friendly exchange of ideas is proper only suggests that he is quite insecure in his position.
MJ: "Since when did the denial that apologetics in [is?] non-antagonistic preclude confidence in ones beliefs?"
Since the beginning of apologetics. In fact, I would say even before apologetics. The lack of confidence started as lack of confidence in one's own mind, and this was already present when the convert discarded reason in preference for faith in invisible magic beings in the first place.
MJ: "You want the Bible's definition of evil?"
I've asked many for it, but none seem to be able to produce one. Let's see what you offered.
MJ: "Morality supervenes (I think it has to supervene for fear of the naturalistic fallacy) on the commands and/or nature of God - see, for example, the Ten Commandments."
I didn't see a definition of the concept 'evil' here (so you number in the statistical average in my experience), nor in "the Ten Commandments." Indeed, you introduce another term - 'morality' - which to my knowledge does not even occur anywhere in the 66 books of the Protestant bible. I would also wonder how this concept is defined as Christians use it. So, that's two words that need to be defined. You seem to be multiplying your burdens here, MJ, rather than meeting any.
MJ: "What validates this definition?"
Good question. (Not that you supplied a definition.)
MJ: "Definitions are self-validating."
Really? According to what theory of concepts? One found in the bible? Oh, that's right, the bible doesn't provide a theory of concepts (one has to look elsewhere for this).
MJ: "And as for comparisons with mad muslims, I think (at least i think i think) the Bible no longer sanctions the execution of unbelievers."
So, the bible changed its position? That’s interesting. Anyway, you don't sound very certain. Perhaps you're still not decided on whether or not "unbelievers" should be executed. Perhaps you consider them a real threat as well.
MJ: "(Luckily for you Dawson…"
Don't worry, MJ, I do not ascribe to a worldview which teaches men to "resist not evil." I have what I need to protect myself. I suppose that's what makes believers feel so uncomfortable.
Regards,
Dawson
Dawson,
Maybe I should, as you say, stop reading your posts, but I have acquired some sort of morbid fascination with them, and so have decided to continue reading them for the moment.
You object, it seems, to my distinction between epitemic and metaphysical possibility. Well, I am quite sure what I mean when I talk about epistemic possibility, but not fully sure when it comes to metaphysical possibility.
By epistemically possible I mean:
An event, e, is epistemically possible (EP) =df the beliefs in either e's occurence or e's non-occurance are both compatible with a set of knowledge, K, held by some subject, S.
You will note that it is a consequence of the foregoing definition that epistemic possibility is subjective, or, if you like, observer-relative. We can expect the epitistemically possible to vary from person to person, according to the extent of their knowledge. Much will be EP for a baby, for example, since it don't know much.
By metaphysically possible (MP) I think I mean something like:
an event, e, is MP =df both e's occurence or non-occurence at time, t, are equally compatible with all states of the universe at any time less than t.
Now, if determinism is true, then, granting the universe's starting conditions, nothing is MP. This is because, on determinism, the state of the universe at one time guarantees (determines) the state of the universe at all subsequent times.
Now I am going to grant, for the sake of argument, that God's plan entails determinism; that, in other words, God with his plan at the creation of the world was and is sufficient for the state of the universe today and in the future. Given God with his plan, there is no other way things could've turned out.
Now to return to the issue at hand:
My claim is that although nothing is MP (because of God's plan), EP is still around, simply by virtue of the fact that we (poor things that we are) are not omniscient. For instance, let us take the event of my house catching fire tomorrow night. It isn't MP. But it is EP (for me at least) since believing that it either will or wont are both compatible with what I know. (They aren't, I restate, both compatible with God's persepctive - he knows what will happen, nothing is EP for him.) The same goes for a belief about the colour of William the Conqueror's eyes - for me the belief that they are blue fits with what I know, and so does the belief that they were brown (the belief that they were multicoloured with pink and purple spots, though, wouldn't really fit, since no-one has eyes like that).
So my contention is that things CAN be at stake because there is the (epistemic) possibility that things CAN go pear-shaped because their going or their not going pear-shaped are both compatible with what I know, as in the case of my house catching fire.
Happy?
Perhaps you might think that the fact that I know that things will all be right in the end (providing I am saved), will cause me to feel low; but this is silly: rather than instilling defeatism, it instills me with a sense of hope and expectation, and is a comfort in dark times. (What are your comforts in such times?)
Yours,
MJ
P.S. Don't you belive in determinism Dawson? Most atheists do these days. Things like agent causation look mighty suspicious on atheist assumptions...
P.P.S Tom (if you have time): Can (or does) a Molinist happily grant determinism while preserving freedom of the will?
MJ,
It depends what you mean by "determinism".
Molinists don't believe that God determines human decisions, for example. Rather humans make their own choices in a purely free way. Molinists simply holds that God knows what they are going to do.
God's knowledge in this sense doesn't entail that humans are determined to do that action. This is illustrated even in our daily lives. For instance, I know that I won't be drunk by noon tomorrow. But I still have the free choice of getting drunk or not by that time. But my merely knowing I won't do that doesn't take away that freedom.
MJ,
[skip confused and irrelevant digression]
"So my contention is that things CAN be at stake because there is the (epistemic) possibility that things CAN go pear-shaped because their going or their not going pear-shaped are both compatible with what I know, as in the case of my house catching fire."
So, what's at stake here? If you say "My house!" you again beg the question, for this assumes it has any value to begin with. But since your god has already determined its fate long in advance (and that plan entails ultimately that it be destroyed one way or another), the outcome is that it has no ultimate value, so ultimately nothing is at stake. Besides, since your knowledge and lack of knowledge are irrelevant, so is this notion of epistemic possibility. Eternity doesn't care what you think is either possible or impossible.
Meanwhile, I asked where the bible affirms this dichotomy between "epistemic possibility" and "metaphysical possibility," but I've not seen any bible citations to satisfy this. Meanwhile, given what the bible does affirm regarding possibility, namely that "all things are possible" (Mt. 19:26), we can safely and surely know that the typical presuppositionalist slogan "Christianity is true because of the impossibility of the contrary" is contrary to what the bible itself teaches (for "all things are possible," including what the presuppositionalist wants to say is impossible).
MJ: "Happy?"
Yes, I am happy.
MJ: "(What are your comforts in such times?)"
What "dark times"? I don't know of any.
MJ: "Don't you belive in determinism Dawson?"
No, because I don't ascribe to the primacy of consciousness. In fact, your question suggests that you're not very familiar with things that I have written.
MJ: "Most atheists do these days."
I have no idea whether that's the case or not, as I'm not in the habit of doing surveys. It wouldn't surprise me, though. Many atheists still have many erroneous views lingering in their minds, thanks to the influence of religion.
MJ: "Things like agent causation look mighty suspicious on atheist assumptions..."
I don't know what you mean by "agent causation" or "atheist assumptions." Since you had to ask whether or not I "believe in determinism," it's clear that you're not very familiar with what I hold to be true.
Regards,
Dawson
Dawson,
This is getting to be a waste of my time but I'll have another stab.
A simple non sequitur: you argue that if something is determined to happen, then it is not of any value.
Tell me why this follows.
And why do you treat me like I'm a presuppositionalist? I'm not (currently). And neither is Tom (just read his previous posts on Van Til and his reasons - reasons with which I am quite sympathetic.)
Why would I need to prove the notion from the Bible anyway? The Bible doesn't tell me that there are currently 4 empty pepsi bottles on my desk, but I'm pretty certain they are there.
And the verse says "WITH GOD all things are possible", but this doesn't entail, of course, that there are no impossible states of affairs, like square circles etc. These aren't really things per se at all. God can do anything that can be done, but not the "things" that can't - this includes making atheism true, and forms the essence of the presuppositionalist's contention.
Tom,
What I mean is, would the Molinist concede that, given God and his omniscience 100 years before I was born, that there was only one possible arrangement of the universe that could obtain at all points subsequent to that time?
I always seem to have difficulty understanding freedom and foreknowledge debates. For instance, you say that the fact that you know you won't get drunk doesn't stop you from freely choosing not to. But surely if it's true that you won't get drunk, then you refraining from drinking cannot obtain, can it? Is this what they call the argument for logical fatalism? I can't see what's wrong with it!
Yours,
MJ
MJ,
Most people confuse "can't" with "won't" in these debates. I think that's what you do here.
From the mere the fact that I or God knows that I won't be drunk at noon, how does it follow that I CAN'T get drunk before noon?
Do you see the spurious assumption here? My mere knowing something about the future doesn't mean I cause that thing to happen. It merely means that I know it will happen. There's no reason to think that our knowing = determining.
By the way, an excellent intro to Molinism and the foreknowledge/fatalism subject is William Lane Craig's *The Only Wise God*. Brilliant book which will clear up many of your questions.
MJ: "A simple non sequitur: you argue that if something is determined to happen, then it is not of any value."
I nowhere argued this. You need to go back and read again if you want to understand what I was saying.
MJ: "And why do you treat me like I'm a presuppositionalist? I'm not (currently). And neither is Tom (just read his previous posts on Van Til and his reasons - reasons with which I am quite sympathetic.)"
I have read Tom's two posts on Van Til. I only quoted one passage from Van Til - namely his statement that "God controls whatsoever comes to pass." Are you saying this is not true, or that you disagree with this?
MJ: "Why would I need to prove the notion from the Bible anyway? The Bible doesn't tell me that there are currently 4 empty pepsi bottles on my desk, but I'm pretty certain they are there."
That's a good question for Scripturalists.
MJ: "And the verse says "WITH GOD all things are possible", but this doesn't entail, of course, that there are no impossible states of affairs, like square circles etc."
Indeed, I don't accept Matt. 19:26 either. It's clearly a false statement.
MJ: "God can do anything that can be done,"
It can do more than this - cf. the cartoon universe premise of theism.
MJ: "but not the 'things' that can't - this includes making atheism true,"
Atheism is simply non-belief in theistic claims. To say atheism is "untrue" simply misses the point. If someone is an atheist, he's an atheist. It's pretty simple really.
Regards,
Dawson
Why would God allow such evils as sceptics trying to dissuade Christians?
Is that an example of one of those 'gratuitous' evils that Tom claims do not exist?
Is Tom a Molinist?
I hope he is, because Molinism is obviously true.
In each and every set of possible circumstances which can occur in our world, a person will freely choose one particular way and God knows which way a person will freely choose , given those circumstances.
This is proved at http://stevencarrwork.blogspot.com/2005/11/william-lane-craig-molinism-and.html
As an example, take two different sets of circumstances that I can conceive of.
1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Wed. 2/11/2005, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.
2) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Wed. 2/11/2005, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose coffee.
Clearly, I can conceive of both sets of circumstances, and they are both logically possible, and they are clearly different to each other.
We can apply Molinism to each set of circumstances, and see if it is true that a person will freely choose one particular way in each set of logically possible circumstances that could occur in a real world.
Molinism works perfectly here.
In the first, I will freely choose one particular way, just like Molinism said I would. I will choose tea.
In the second set of circumstances, Molinism is right again. I will choose one particular way. I will choose coffee.
So what is the problem?
If God wants me to drink either tea or coffee, whichever suits his plans better, he simply creates the world where I freely choose the beverage he desires.
Tom writes 'From the mere the fact that I or God knows that I won't be drunk at noon, how does it follow that I CAN'T get drunk before noon?
Do you see the spurious assumption here? My mere knowing something about the future doesn't mean I cause that thing to happen.'
Tom knowing he will be sober tomorrow, means that it is not Tom who causes himself to be sober?
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