Moving

Thanks to everyone has visited my blog and read some of my posts. I hope you'll continue to come back.

I will have a slight delay in posting, however, as I'll be moving for the next few days (from Texas to NY). Please bear with me and don't abandon the blog. I promise there'll be more interesting material in the future.

Thanks.

Who Designed God?

The teleological or design argument is, I think, one of the strongest weapons in the case for theism. The reality of a transcendent designer is evident not only when we look at the cosmos as an overarching whole, but also when we examine the biological systems inhabiting it. On the design or "fine-tuning" of the cosmos I recommend the writings of philosopher Robin Collins. Regarding design in biology, see the work of William Dembski.

However, many critics find the design argument unsatisfying. This is in fact for various reasons, all of which I think are dubious. But one of the main objections to the argument is in my opinion especially bad.

Many objectors complain that if complex order requires a designing intelligence to account for it, then so must the Designer. After all, it takes a rather complex mind to plan and design an entire universe and its creatures. So, even the Designer of the universe must be designed by another mind--we ultimately have an infinite regress. Moreover, since the God of classical theism is, by definition, undesigned (and uncaused) the Designer of the cosmos (even if there were one) must not be this God.

There are numerous replies to this criticism, many of them being suitable to defeat it, I think. But I wish to bring up one I believe has not been noted. That is, I believe the distinction between a necessary and contingent being comes into play in the defense of the argument. When the proponent of the design argument holds that ordered complexity requires a designer, he should be seen as saying that contingent ordered complexity requires a designer. That is, if a certain thing did not have to be as it is and its present complexity is thus contingent, that requires that that being is designed. Thus, since the universe's order is contingent (it didn't have to be ordered as it is), it qualifies as being designed. However, since God on theism is necessary and thus cannot be other than He is, then this God is exempt from being designed. Only contingent complexity requires a Mind for its origin; necessary complexity has no origin.

For this and other reasons this objection fails to dismantle the argument. The fact that the universe requires a brilliant mind as its architect does not trigger an infinite regress of designers. Rather, one could simply postulate that its designer is, in effect, necessarily complex, having no origin, and thus having no Originator.

Ontological Argument

If it is impossible for something to exist, this implies that no matter what sort of world we conceive of, that thing will not exist there. Philosophers call these conceptual worlds "possible worlds" (PW). (PWs are not universes, since a world could exist without a universe--e.g., God existing alone.) An example of such a thing is a married bachelor. It is literally impossible for a man to exist as a married bachelor. Thus, there is no possible world where such a man exists.

But what would be the opposite of an impossible being? It seems the opposite would be a being who must exist in all PWs. This sort of being is called a "necessary being" by philosophers.

Both impossible and necessary beings are similar in that their possible existence in one PW demonstrates their status in all PWs. Look at the impossible being again. If we know something is literally impossible in our world (i.e., married bachelors), we know they can't exist in any PW. Similarly, if we know that a necessary being could exist in our world, then we know it exists in all PWs.

Now, classical theism has typically seen God as an infinite being who exists necessarily. As such, a crucial question is this: is it possible for God to exist? If it is possible, that means there is a PW where God exists. But, as we noted above, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist at all, then it exists in all PWs. And since our actual world is a PW, that means that being even exists in our PW.

So, if it possible for God to exist as a necessary being, then God exists in our world.

But it does seem at all controversial to say that God can possibly exist in reality, does it? Indeed, it seems even most atheists would grant this live possibility. But this intuitive truth would thus establish God as a necessary being, and thus a being who actually exists in the real world.

Maybe the atheist will say he's not sure whether it's possible for God exist. Though I find this totally implausible, I think theists could answer this by giving actual arguments that show that God could exist.

William Lane Craig documents this well in his recent chapter titled "The Ontological Argument" in To Everyone an Answer ed. Frank Beckwith, JP Moreland, and Craig. Craig notes that several theistic arguments appear sound and, when taken together, show that an omniscient, all-powerful, all-good, and necessary being exists.

But, of course, this implies that it is of course possible for such a being to exist. With that possibility, we see that God, as a necessary being, exists in all possible worlds.

Some object that if we already have arguments that ultimately show the existence of such a necessary being, then the Ontological Argument becomes superfluous. But this is a mistaken way of viewing the arguments for theism. Rather than seeing them as separate weapons to be unloaded on the atheist. They instead can be used as an unified whole, neatly integrated in the overarching Ontological Argument.

Why Liddell is #1

Currently, the Ultimate Fighting world is comprised of two major organizations: the Ultimate Fighting Championship in the US and PRIDE Fighting Championship in Japan. These are the premier mixed martial arts event holders in the world and are in constant competition for fan loyalty.

Intriguingly, these companies compete at various levels. Not only do they wish to draw the most fans, but they also want to have the top champions in the world in their ranks. As such, there is much debate among fans and experts in the fight game over which camp in fact has the latter.

Nowhere is this debate more heated than in the 205 lb. weight-class. Both UFC and PRIDE have beltholders at this weight and they are both arguably the most popular fighters on the planet currently. For PRIDE, the belt resides with Wanderlei "The Axe Murderer" Silva and for UFC, Chuck "The Iceman" Liddell holds the title. They have similar styles, as both are known for their standup fighting (punching and kicking) more than their ground skills. At the same time, though, both are skilled in all areas and thus don't have particular weaknesses to be exploited easily.

But for several reasons, I give the nod to Liddell as being presently the greatest fighter in this category. I list them briefly here:

1. Liddell has simply a more impressive list of opponents and victories than Silva. Liddell's record reads like a "Who's Who" of the mixed martial arts community. He has only three losses, all of which were to top-tier fighters. He's already avenged one of these (against Couture) and another he will likely avenge in his upcoming bout against Jeremy Horn. Silva just does not have an equivalent amount of high-level victories on his record.

2. Liddell seems to have a slightly superior skill-set. Both are excellent strikers, but Liddell appears to have more power in his punches and kicks than does Silva. This has been noted by fighters like Quinton Jackson and Guy Mezger who have had classic battles with both of the beltholders. Liddell also has probably the best takedown defense in the world and certainly better than Silva's. Lastly, Liddell's ground game seems at least equivalent to Silva's, although he doesn't go to the ground in most fights. Arguably, his ground skills may even be superior since Liddell was a Division I collegiate wrestler.

3. Liddell appears to have a better chin than Silva. Liddell rarely, if ever, gets knocked down in a fight and has certainly never been knocked out. The same can't be said of Silva who was knocked out by Vitor Belfort and Tito Ortiz (both of whom Liddell defeated). Liddell is widely recognized as having one of the best chins in the sport.

These, then, are at least three of the reasons I would give for crowning Liddell the #1 light-heavyweight fighter in the world. It is a close call between the two, but in virtually all dimensions of the fight game, Liddell edges Silva out. Of course, the best way to decide the issue ultimately is to have the two meet each other in battle. Let's continually hope that that finally happens.

Martin vs. Wanchick on Divine Omniscience

I've posted my article critiquing Martin's arguments that God cannot be omniscient and therefore the God of Christianity cannot exist. Now I'll let you see how my critique held to up to scrutiny from Martin himself. I confronted Martin by asking a question at the Internet Infidels forum (a site where he's posted many papers). He kindly replied and eventually had to end the discussion due to time constraints. The actual forum discussion can be seen here.

[Tom Wanchick]
In his debate with Phil Fernandes (and elsewhere) Dr. Michael Martin argues that the God of classical theism cannot be truly omniscient. He claims that for one to be omniscient, one must have propositional knowledge (knowledge of true propositions like "Atheism is false"), procedural knowledge (e.g., knowing how to ride a bike), and knowledge by acquaintance (knowledge through experience, like knowing what it's like to be poor).

While God could have propositional knowledge, Dr. Martin claims that in most cases He could not have the other two types. For example, God has no body, and thus He would not know how to swim and He could not know what it feels like to swim (since He's never swam).

I'm curious. It seems true that these latter types of knowledge, if we have them, are held in our minds. If I can swim, I have the knowledge of how to swim, even if I am not now swimming. Often, even if a person becomes paralyzed we say that they know how to swim; they just don't have the ability to do it anymore. Thus, we actually retain that knowledge in our intellects. Moreover, if I used to be poor but am now rich, then we would still say that I have knowledge by acquaintance of poverty, since I've experienced it. Again, the knowledge is retained even if we're no longer in that situation.

My question is this: If humans can hold these sorts of knowledge in their minds, couldn't God hold it in His mind, as well? After all, He is a mind or soul. It's true that God would not obtain such knowledge like we do, since He has never ridden a bike, etc. But it doesn't appear He'd have to acquire it. As an omniscient person, He could have this knowledge essentially (just as He has mathematical knowledge essentially and need not acquire it even though we learn it through study). Am I wrong?

--Tom Wanchick

[Michael Martin]
Mr. Wanchick misunderstands my argument from knowledge by acquaintance rather badly. My point is that God could not have some knowledge by acquaintance (for example, lust, greed, envy) and be morally perfect. In a similar way, God cannot have knowledge by acquaintance of frustration and be all-powerful.

With respect to the knowledge how to ride a bike or swim, I disagree that this is just in one's mind. If it were just in one's mind, one could learn how to swim or ride a bike by reading a book or attending lectures. Moreover, some people know how to ride or swim and yet cannot explain it while others do not know how to ride a bike in the ability sense and yet might be able to write a book on "How to ride a bike"--that is, they only have propositional knowledge of bike riding.

The case of the paralyzed person is interesting. It does not show the knowledge how is in the mind. For consider what it would mean to say that Jones, who is paralyzed, knows how to ride a bike. It would mean that IF Jones were no longer paralyzed, THEN he would be able to ride a bike. His knowledge is a physical skill closely connected with his body, physical practice and training.


Michael Martin

[Tom Wanchick]
I greatly appreciate Dr. Martin's willingness to answer my questions on this subject.

On knowledge by acquaintance, I was assuming Dr. Martin's argument could be extended to all sorts of feelings, not just those of lust, envy, etc. I thought there was this general line of thought: God can't know what He has not experienced. Perhaps I was wrong, since Dr. Martin restricts his argument to God's moral nature.

But this evokes another query: Would God have knowledge by acquaintance of all things that do not conflict with His goodness? E.g., would God know what it is like to be poor? Presumably, God has never been poor. But if God can know poverty without ever being poor, couldn't He know envy without ever being envious?

On procedural knowledge, the case of paralysis strikes me. If Jones knows how to ride a bike even when he's paralyzed (as Dr. Martin seems to grant), then why can't God know how to ride a bike despite being now unembodied? Jones has the procedural knowledge without the physical ability. Couldn't God have this, too? Couldn't we say: IF God became incarnate, THEN He would be able to ride a bike. Then God would be in the same situation as Jones. And we all agree that a paralyzed Jones has procedural knowledge of bike riding.

[Michael Martin]
The point of my argument is to show that God could not be all-knowing. I think that I show that by showing that certain knowledge by acquaintance is incompatible with God's moral perfection. God could not be ALL-knowing and be morally perfect since being morally perfect is incompatible with having knowledge by acquaintance of feeling hate, envy and so on. It is irrelevant to this argument whether God can have other knowledge by acquaintance, for example, knowledge by acquaintance of being poor. Perhaps God can feel what it is like to be poor. But this may not conflict with any of his other properties. On the other hand, it may. For what it is worth, an argument from poverty MAY be possible. Being poor means to lack certain material worth necessary for happiness, comfort, and so forth. But since material worth is necessarily irrelevant to God there may indeed be a problem about God having knowledge by acquaintance of being poor. He could not and still be God (someone might argue).

I think the question of whether a paralyzed man can ride a bike is much more complicated than Wanchick says or I might have suggested in my first reply. Certainly a necessary condition is that the man will be able to ride if he were not paralyzed. But I doubt this is sufficient. Suppose the man was permanently paralyzed. Perhaps in this case the accurate thing to say is that he did know how to ride a bike but no longer does. Or perhaps in this case there is no clear answer. In any case, there seems to me a huge difference between being a temporarily paralyzed man knowing how to ride a bike and God knowing how before becoming incarnate. Before becoming incarnate God did not have this knowledge: He had no body, no practice, had never been on a bike. He would obtain this knowledge only after his incarnation. So he would not be all-knowing prior to incarnation. On the other hand, the temporarily paralyzed man has had the training, has ridden a bike, has a body and will ride again.


Michael Martin

[Tom Wanchick]
Allow me to clarify my point here. Let's assume knowing poverty is not inconistent with the divine nature. My question is: If God exists right now does He know poverty? If Dr. Martin says yes, then he grants that God can have knowledge by acquaintance of a thing (poverty) without every experiencing that thing (since God's never been poor). But then Dr. Martin's argument against knowledge by acquaintance is refuted. We would conclude that God can have such knowledge without experiencing the thing known. Thus, God could know lust without ever lusting. God would not have to act against His nature to have any such knowledge.

But Dr. Martin need not grant this in order for my rebuttal to work. For I simply note that knowledge by acquaintance is held in the mind (as shown by Dr. Martin's admission that God can have some of this knowledge). As such, theists can say God holds this knowledge in His mind essentially as a necessarily omniscient person. He need not ACQUIRE it and thus wouldn't have to do anything against His nature to have such knowledge.

On procedural knowledge, there are clear cases showing that physical capability is not a necessary condition for holding this knowledge. Joe is a gold medalist swimmer. He separates both shoulders in an accident and is physically unable to swim for a month. It would be crazy to say Joe literally doesn't know how to swim for a month. Rather, everyone would agree that Joe knows how to swim, he's just not in the condition to do so. But if Joe can hold "knowledge how" w/o physical ability, then so can God. That God has never swum before is no problem. Again, God is essentially omniscient and thus He can be said to hold such knowledge essentially w/o acquiring it. Given incarnation, he will simply be able to swim since He knew how to prior to His physical ability to do so (i.e. embodiment), just as Joe knew how to swim prior to his physical ability to do so (i.e., his shoulders' healing).

(Note that to claim such knowledge can be held by an unembodied mind does not commit one to saying such knowledge is propositional. The mind can hold non-propositional knowledge. Knowledge by acquaintance is one example.)

[Forum Moderator]
Copied here from feedback to facilitate further discussion. Michael Martin declines to respond further saying that he simply does not have time to be involved in an ongoing discussion such as this.

Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience (II)

Here is the second (and final) portion of my paper criticizing Martin's arguments against the coherence of theism.

Moving away from Martin's first criticism, we proceed on to his second. Here, it is God's lack of a physical body that supposedly conflicts with His omniscience. If God is to be omniscient He must know how to do everything including swimming, riding bikes, and any other physical act. But God, an immaterial being, does not even have the physical body enabling Him to have these skills. Thus, God inevitably does not know how to do these things and He lacks forms of knowledge required of omniscience.[7]

Again, however, we confront unanswered questions. Why does God's lack of a physical body disqualify Him from knowing how to perform physical acts? Surely, even a human person does not have to have the bodily ability to perform some physical act A in order to know how to do A. An Olympic swimmer sidelined with a separated shoulder lacks the physical ability to swim for several weeks. But, of course, no one claims that during this time he literally does not know how to swim! Rather, he knows how to swim, but is just not in the bodily condition to do so. Theists can conjecture that possibly God is in a similar situation. God may not have the requisite body needed to swim, etc., but like the injured Olympian, He could seemingly hold this knowledge even without the bodily ability

Martin would presumably have a retort to this, however. Even if God does not need a body in order to retain knowledge of how to do these activities, He does need a body in order to acquire this knowledge initially. But since God has never become embodied and gone swimming or ridden a bike, God has never acquired that knowledge.
But now we see that this second line of argument runs headlong into the same problems as the first. The relevant question again becomes, Why must God acquire this knowledge at all? Can He not just have it essentially, in the same way He has mathematical knowledge?[8]

From inspecting both of Martin's arguments, then, we see that they rely on the dubious assumption that God must gain certain kinds of knowledge in the same way human persons do. In effect, Martin appears to confuse God with man. Theists can reply to such assumptions by noting that they are just that -- mere assumptions buttressed by no supporting argument. In fact, even atheists will admit that God, if He exists, will know innately many things that humans know only through determined research and learning. It is unclear why God's procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance could not be among this innate knowledge. Without any reason to disbelieve this, Martin's arguments remain question-begging and are therefore effectively undercut.


[7] Martin, Atheism, p. 288.
[8] As with knowledge by acquaintance (see note 6), it seems even finite beings can originate with in-built procedural knowledge. As an example, Bible believers hold that Adam could walk and talk without ever learning. Even if this account is mythical, it seems clearly possible, thereby showing the possibility of a person having such skills even prior to his ever performing the acts.

Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience (I)

This is a version of an essay I recently published in an issue of the philosophy journal Think. It criticizes a couple of arguments made by atheist philosopher Michael Martin that God cannot be omniscient because that would conflict with some of God's other qualities (e.g., goodness, incorporeality). I review the arguments briefly and find their problems. I break the essay into two parts, each addressing a separate argument from Martin.

Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience

Is it possible for God to exist? To laymen, this query may appear rather ridiculous. 'Of course', one might say, 'many do not believe God actually exists, but surely His reality is at least possible.' For professional philosophers, however, even this bare possibility has not always been a given. Indeed, it has been alleged by significant nontheistic thinkers today and in the past that the very idea of God makes literally no sense. For these scholars, the classical concept of God is a contradiction in terms, as many of God's own attributes purportedly conflict with one another. Just as there can exist no man who is both married and a bachelor, so there can exist no person who (like God), for example, transcends the universe and yet is present everywhere in it.

But due to sophisticated refutations from theistic philosophers, such arguments, while flourishing in previous decades, have now largely fallen out of favor. Interestingly, some philosophers, reflecting on the recent resurgence of theism in the field of philosophy note that, in a certain sense, this line of argumentation ironically served to strengthen the theistic position. For the time and effort given to solving these puzzles finally produced a more refined and therefore more defensible understanding of God and His attributes.[1] Thus, we find influential atheist philosopher Michael Tooley's remark that, "arguments based upon claims that the concept of God is incoherent are [not] impressive at all."[2] Many prominent atheist thinkers would concur.[3]

Michael Martin, however, is one who would not. In his own writings on atheism, Martin has devoted ample time to the task of showing that the God of classical theism has qualities that cannot co-exist in any one being. Accordingly, God so construed is nonexistent.

Now given the hesitance of many atheist scholars to support such a thesis (as we saw above) one might assume that Martin has found something these researchers have overlooked. He perhaps has some insight that many of today's philosophers do not have. Interestingly, though, upon perusing Martin's work in this area, we find nothing of the sort. I wish to examine two of Martin's arguments against divine omniscience in particular and why they fail.

As a foundation for these arguments, Martin first defines what it means for God to be omniscient (all-knowing). In his view, to say God is omniscient is to say God has every kind of knowledge perfectly. God must not only know all truths, He must also have all procedural knowledge or know-how (e.g., knowing how to ride a bike), as well as all knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowing what it feels like to stub a toe, knowing the experience of war, etc.).[4] Unless and until, a person has all of this knowledge, he or she is not omniscient.

Now this conception of omniscience is not unproblematic, as it would be widely rejected by theologians and philosophers of religion, most of whom hold that to be omniscient, one merely has to know all truths and hold no false beliefs. This excludes the types of procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance mentioned by Martin.

But even granting Martin's account, his arguments appear flawed. With his conception in mind, he first contends that God cannot have all knowledge by acquaintance and also be morally perfect. For to have the former, God must know, for instance, what it feels like to lust after a woman or to be in a drunken stupor. But surely, says Martin, a paragon of morality like God cannot know what it is like to participate in these unethical acts and thus God cannot be omniscient in Martin's sense.[5]

As we can see, implicit in this criticism is apparently the assumption that one must participate in such acts in order to know what they feel like. God, then, must become drunk or actually lust for a woman in order to know the felt quality of things like intoxication or lust. Since a morally perfect person by definition cannot do such things, it follows that God can never know what it is like to do them.
But why must we presume that actually participating in such things is necessary to know what it feels like to so participate? Why believe that, for instance, one's being drunk is necessary to know what it is like to be drunk? Martin never comes out and addresses this point. Perhaps he is working with a certain analogy: since humans must engage in these acts in order to be acquainted with them, God does too. But surely this inference is weak. Everyone agrees that God need not acquire certain forms of knowledge that humans must acquire. For example, I have to study long and hard to master the Calculus. But God, if He exists, knows all mathematical truths eternally and essentially in virtue of His omniscience; He never has to learn mathematics. Maybe God's knowledge by acquaintance, then, is like His mathematical knowledge: He does not acquire it, but simply has it. [6] A theist who posits this can claim that God can know lust, drunkenness, and so on without ever actually being lustful or drunk.

Moreover, it cannot be said that the mere knowledge of these things taints God and makes Him immoral. A reformed alcoholic remembers (and therefore knows) what it feels like to be inebriated. But no one says that this person is immoral for having that knowledge. Rather, it is just his previous act of being inebriated that was morally wrong.

[1] See William Lane Craig, "The Coherence of Theism: Introduction," in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 203.
[2] Michael Tooley and William Lane Craig, "Debate on the Existence of God: Questions from the Audience" found online at http://spot.colorado.edu/~tooley/DebatewithCraig.html
[3] For a list of some such thinkers see, Charles Taliaferro, "The Possibility of God," in The Rationality of Theism, ed. Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 240.
[4] Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 287-288.
[5] Ibid., p. 288.
[6] Even the claim that humans must experience these acts in order to be acquainted with them is easily challenged. For instance, it seems obviously possible for God (or some supernatural person) to create an adult human who knows what it feels like to, say, run a marathon, even though he or she has never done so.

Nobody's Perfect...Are They?

It seems like everyone's uttered this line at least once in their life. You know, like when you get caught lying or slacking on the job.

Strangely, this brief statement seems to assume a sort of non-Christian ideology. After all, the statement implies that if someone perfect exists, then he/she could seemingly hold us accountable for our wrongdoings. He might say, "Well, I can do it perfectly, why don't you?"

However, on the Christian view, God does exist and He is perfect in every sense. God makes blunders of no sort. Thus, our questioner seems driven to admit that if God is real, then He can hold us accountable for our wrong actions, i.e., sin.

"But," our objector says, "this can't be correct, since God is divine and humans are mortal. All I'm saying is that no human is perfect."

But, on Christianity, this would still be inaccurate since Jesus Christ is fully human and yet without sin. And while other humans inevitably sin due to their fallen state, they nonetheless have the chance to gain Christ's purity by being covered by His sacrifice. Do that, and you will be pure and deserving of Heaven in God's eyes.

Thus, this old, standard statement seems to subtly support the often-ridiculed idea that God could punish wrongdoers. The God who is Perfect and allows us to be also, certainly does have every right to send those rebellious against Him to Hell. We know this not only through the study of good theology, but also through our casual quips.

Randy Couture and the Ultimate Apologetic

"You will know them by their fruits. Grapes are not gathered from thorn bushes nor figs from thistles, are they?" (Matthew 7:16)

Such were Jesus's words when He warned his followers of false teachers and manipulators. If you want to know someone's true standing and character, just look at his outward activity.

If we judge most professional athletes today by this standard, we'll find much rotten fruit. Pro sports today generally presents ghetto-like grandstanding, rampant off-the-field crime, and even attacks on the fans (see last November's Pistons/Pacers game).

But the sport of Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) has a little something different. Though MMA holds nowhere near the popularity of pro basketball or football, it does boast one of the great champions of our time. Randy Couture is in fact a 4-time UFC champion. A world-class Greco-Roman wrestler, Couture is no bar-room brawler, but a renowned athlete who has brought the sport to the new level of professionalism it boasts today. Indeed, he's often considered the greatest MMA pro the world has seen to date. And even fellow greats like Shaquille O'Neal cite Couture as their favorite professional athlete.

Couture, though, brings far more than his fists to the table. In a sport dominated by tough guys looking to knock you out, Couture stands out as the wise, soft-spoken veteran. Neither loud nor brash, he exudes confident humility. It seems virtually the whole MMA world loves him. Mention Couture, and fighters from all over express their admiration for "The Natural".

Perhaps unaware, Couture has in effect brought together the best of two worlds in his approach to fighting. The Natural himself has noted that it is his Christian faith that drives his excellence both in the ring and outside it. As such, Couture has been able to show the world not only his prowess as a fighter, but also his power as a Christian. In attracting droves of dedicated fans (including many fellow fighters), Couture has essentially shown the power of a true Christ-like life to thousands of non-Christians.

Christian philosopher William Lane Craig is the foremost defender of the truth of Christianity. Craig, of course, uses his mind rather than his fists in his defense. But Craig and Couture are on the same page on one crucial point: the ultimate Christian apologetic comes not via argument or fists but by Christian character shown through Christ-like actions.

Craig ends his book Reasonable Faith with this insightful point: "More often than not, it is what you are rather than what you say that will bring an unbeliever to Christ. This, then, is the ultimate apologetic. For the ultimate apologetic is: your life" (p. 302).

Randy Couture is looked up to as the consummate fighter: respectful, humble, tough, and unafraid. Notably, these are all the marks of a dedicated follower of Christ (who Himself had these qualities). Randy Couture is indeed not only the ultimate fighter, but also the ultimate witness.

Evil: Naturalism's Enemy

Throughout history, Judeo-Christian theism's main enemy has undoubtedly been evil. This does include Satan and his minions, of course, but it includes evil also in a different sense. It includes evil in the philosophical sense.

Discussions of the argument from evil (i.e., if God exists, there wouldn't be so much evil in the world) have run rampant in philosophy. Noticeably, in reading the dialogues on this, it's clear that theists have the advantage. This is shown in The Evidential Argument From Evil ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (ch. 10, I think). See also William Lane Craig in God?.

But while this traditional problem has received much treatment, a separate but equally powerful one has received little. It is a separate problem mainly because it is someone else's; namely, the naturalist's.

R. Douglas Geivett has noted that naturalists, while generally advocating the argument from evil, tend never to define its terms. Oddly, for all the attention they give evil, they never tell us what it is.

He notes that a plausible definition of evil is "a departure from the way things ought to be". This seems intuitive. E.g., if a deer is burned to death in a fire, this is a natural evil. Likewise, when a human is murdered, this is moral evil. In both cases, the victims are in circumstances they should not be in ideally. Deer should be eating and playing. Humans should be in healthy relationships. When they depart from these ideal roles, we call this an instance of evil.

Thus, these cases seem to reveal that things in the universe ought to be a certain way. Deer ought to be eating and prancing and humans ought to live in accord with others. But if all things are accidental, as naturalists claim, how can they have an optimal way to be? We should expect things to act a certain way only if they were designed to do so. Bike parts are designed to make bikes; they are misused otherwise. But if those same parts somehow were formed accidentally, they wouldn't have an objective purpose--they couldn't be misused.

So, the line of reasoning underlying all of this appears to be this:

1. Evil exists.
2. Evil is a departure from the way things ought to be.
3. If there is a departure from the way things ought to be, then there is a way things ought to be.
4. Therefore, there is a way things ought to be.
5. If there is a way things ought to be, then there is a design plan for things.
6. If there is a design plan for things, then there must be a Designer.
7. Therefore, there must be a Designer.

#1 is admitted by naturalists who say evil is a real problem. #2 is supported by the the deer and human examples. #3 is true by definition. #4 follows from #2 and #3. #5 is obvious from the bike parts illustration. #6 is obvious and #7 follows deductively from #5 and #6.

These premises all seem more plausible than their denials, thus making this a sound argument, thus we conclude that an incomprehensibly powerful and intelligent being designed the universe and the things in it for various purposes and enabled us to discern evil.

This Designer just appears to be the person we all call 'God'. We find, then, that evil is a problem that theists have seemingly solved and naturalists have most obviously not.

Tips for Amateur Apologists

I have been studying apologetics since 1998 and, while I'm not a recognized standout in the field, I have been able to make substantial strides in my apologetics prowess since that time. When I first began, I would've never dreamed I would be able to get any of my apologetics writings included in real, print publications. But, happily, that happened earlier this year when I had articles published in the Christian Research Journal, as well as Think (a British philosophy journal). I now also have the competence to dialogue with non-Christian scholars and professors (as opposed to only non-scholars) who criticize Christianity, as I've done with Michael Martin and Richard Carrier.

So, how does an amateur apologist improve his skills? In my experience, I can think of about six key factors that have greatly helped me in this endeavour.

1. Become proficient in logic and argumentation Underlying all apologetic tasks is the ability to think well. To do this, you must have a working knowledge of at least key aspects of logic. This allows you to both build your own arguments concisely, and tear down your opponent's. Norman Geisler's book, Come, Let Us Reason helped me tremendously here. It is especially good for Christians in its use of Christian illustrations in its chapter exercises and questions. Other excellent books on this include Peter Kreeft's Socratic Logic, as well as Cohen and Copi's, Introduction to Logic.

2. Become familiar with the discipline of philosophy Philosophy is etymologically, "the search for wisdom". Almost all great apologists both today and in centuries past have been philosophers. Philosophers are trained to construct logical arguments in their search for answers to hard questions (e.g., Does the soul exist?, Does God exist?, What is good?) and to argue for their viewpoint. Interestingly, many of the best philosophers today are Christians: Plantinga, Adams, Craig, Swinburne. Fine introductions to philosophy include Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview by J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, and also Geisler's Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective.

3. Study the best apologists available It is crucial to get a good grounding in sound apologetics when you begin. Sadly, Christian books today are often shallow and unedifying, making it all the more critical for new apologists to carefully discern what to study. (Christian bookstores rarely sell good apologetics works, so the safest bet is to buy such books online or get them from the library.) Essentially, anything written by William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland, Gary Habermas, Norman Geisler, Paul Copan, Douglas Groothuis, Frank Beckwith, or Greg Koukl will be excellent. Fortunately, they typically write books targeted for both lay and academic audiences. Beginners can progress from the former to the latter as they grow.

Nice starting places are Moreland's Scaling the Secular City and Craig's Reasonable Faith for philosophical apologetics. Habermas and Licona have an excellent book defending Jesus's Resurrection called The Case for Jesus's Resurrection. On evolution/intelligent design issues, a fine start is Signs of Intelligence edited by William Dembski.

These books will provide a firm foundation for future growth. As you read, you should also peruse the author's footnotes and book recommendations to find further resources. If they commend it, it's worth reading. Make a list of such titles and acquire them when you can. You'll see your personal library--and your knowledge base--expand rapidly.

4. Challenge yourself to progress J.P. Moreland has remarked that the mind is like a muscle--the more you use it and the tougher you work it, the stronger, more proficient it becomes. I have seen this occur in my own life. I began studying the kinds of books I noted in #3 above and found myself slowly moving to more and more technical writings. In the beginning, books written for academic audiences seem intimidating and over your head, but if you sit down and concentrate on understanding the text, you'll be surprised at how much your thinking and comprehension will improve.

Fine technical works in apologetics include, Moreland and Craig's Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, Dembski's, No Free Lunch, and Habermas's The Resurrection of Jesus: An Inquiry.

Take a shot at these eventually and you'll be surprised at the improvement in your critical thinking, and, ultimately, your apologetics.

5. Become well-rounded I've always been amazed at philosopher William Lane Craig. You name it and Craig has mastered it: philosophical apologetics, the Resurrection, the nature of God, etc. His breadth of knowledge is amazing. Becoming knowledgeable in the areas of apologetics (especially philosophy, history, and science) will accomplish at least two things: (i) it will better prepare you to answer various objections on different topics from your opponents, and (ii) in studying different topics, you'll more easily find your favorite areas and resultantly make those your emphasis (Gary Habermas, e.g., is good at philosophical apologetics, but specializes in defending the Resurrection).

6. Read the work of your opponents Last, but not least, it is pivotal to stay current with the objections and arguments of your nonChristian opponents. If you don't know what your opponents are saying, you'll be less prepared to answer them when the time comes. At first, reading the opposition will be a little scary and you'll ask yourself, "What if I can't answer those arguments?" But as time passes, you'll find that virtually no objections to Christianity seem unanswerable and you'll become efficient in finding those answers. This will build confidence not only in your ability as a defender of the faith, but also in the fact that your faith is sound and founded on a reasonable basis.

The Internet has some good writings by nonChristians. A decent start would be Internet Infidels, which has a large library of articles. These are uneven in quality, but reading the work of folks like Michael Martin, Jeff Lowder, Richard Carrier, or Evan Fales are generally decent. From there, you can progress to anti-Christian books such as those by Martin, Robert Price (on the historical Jesus), and Theodore Drange.

There you have it; six factors in improving your apologetics game. Undoubtedly, it takes time to mature in the discipline, but the rewards are great, as you'll eventually serve Christ by confronting a nonChristian culture with, and leading its people to, the Truth.

A UFC Summer

Tell anyone that you are a fan of the Ultimate Fighting Championships (UFC) and you are bound to be asked, "Isn't that just bar-room brawling inside a ring?"

While the older days (originating in 1993) of UFC may have had tendencies towards this, it's status since then has changed dramatically. It is now indisputable that Mixed Martial Arts (MMA, i.e., Ultimate Fighting) is a sport requiring determined training and athleticism. Its participants are honed athletes. Its ranks include Olympic wrestlers, champion kickboxers, and martial artists of various sorts (Judo, Jiu-Jitsu).

Much of the reason for the misconception of the sport is its lack of exposure to mainstream audiences. Its main events are typically shown on Pay-Per-View, rather than national TV.

But this is about to change. Learn more about the exciting sport of MMA with this summer schedule of the first ever UFC events live on free national TV. The upcoming schedule goes as such:

July 25th - 11:05 pm et
Unleashed - Spike TV
Stephan Bonnar vs. Forrest Griffin
Diego Sanchez vs. Kenny Florian
Alex Karalexis vs. Josh Rafferty
Mike Swick vs. Alex Schoenauer

August 1st - 11:05 pm et
Unleashed - Spike TV
Ivan Salaverry vs. Tony Fryklund
Ivan Salaverry vs. Joe Riggs
Chris Leben vs. Jason Thacker
Josh Koscheck vs. Chris Sanford
Nate Quarry vs. Lodune Sincaid

August 6th - 9:00 pm et
Ultimate Fight Night - Spike TV
Ivan Salaverry vs Nathan Marquardt
Stephan Bonnar vs Sam Hoger
Kenny Florian vs Alex Karalexis
Mike Swick vs Keith Rockel
Josh Koscheck vs Pete Spratt
Nate Quarry vs Pete Sell
Chris Leben vs Patrick Cote
Drew Fickett vs Josh Neer

August 8th - 11:05 pm et
Unleashed - Spike TV
Content TBA

August 14th - Check local listings time
Fox Sports Network
Chuck Liddell vs. Jeremy Horn (old fight)
Chuck Liddell vs. "Renato Babalu" Sobral (old fight)
Horn Highlights

August 15th - 11:05 pm et
Unleashed - Spike TV
Content TBA

August 22 - 11:05 pm et
The Ultimate Fighter 2 - Spike TV
Welterweights & Heavyweights compete for two UFC contracts.

Reply to Baggini (III)

This is the third and final portion of my review of Julian Baggini's, *Atheism: A Very Short Introduction*. I previously inspected his arguments for atheism and against theistic ethics. Here, I look at his objections to theistic arguments.

REASONS FOR THEISM

Before concluding, Baggini critiques some famous arguments for God’s existence. Two of the most popular, he remarks, are the cosmological and teleological arguments, both of which he deems utter failures.

Cosmological Argument

Baggini derides the cosmological argument, labeling it a 'disgrace' to philosophy, despite variations of it being defended by renowned philosophers throughout history.

Roughly, cosmological arguments purport to show that the universe has a transcendent explanation or cause. Baggini badly misconstrues the argument as saying 'that since everything has a cause, the universe has a cause' (94). No theist actually uses this version, as it entails that even God is caused, which is impossible. Craig offers a more precise formulation:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Here, it is not all things but merely all objects that (unlike God) begin to exist that have a cause. Baggini inadvertently supports this premise with his declaration that 'evidence is stronger if it is available to inspection by more people on repeated occasions' (13). Since nothing has been verified more repeatedly or more widely than the claim that things do not pop into existence out of nothing (no one has ever witnessed this), it enjoys maximally strong evidence.10 We thus conclude that the space-time universe, which even Baggini grants had a beginning, requires a cause.

Baggini complains that this proves the reality of a 'cause which is greater than the universe…and which is itself uncaused' (95), but falls short of full-blown theism.

But the being proved is far more God-like than he allows. For, at least prior to the universe, the cause was outside space and time, as it brought these into existence. Additionally, this timeless cause will be immaterial (since material things can only exist in time), and unimaginably powerful (since it can create the universe out of nothing). Moreover, the cause must be a mind, since minds are the only entities that can be both timeless and causally active.11

Finally, even if the argument proves merely a First Cause, this is no discouragement, as further arguments show this cause to have God’s traditional attributes. For instance, this being is plausibly the same person who grounds the moral law, as mentioned in our discussion of ethics above.

Teleological Argument

Baggini’s treatment of the teleological or design argument fares little better. Asserting that Darwinism easily accounts for the apparent design of biological systems, he fails to mention that important scholars cite strong evidence against that hypothesis and in favor of intelligent design.

He likewise argues against the notion that the universe itself exhibits design, objecting that since we have no prior experience of designed universes, we have no basis for thinking ours is designed (96). This criticism is out of touch with contemporary design theory, however, which shows such experience unnecessary in discerning signs of intelligence (see, e.g., William Dembski's, *The Design Revolution*, which answers this objection).

Ultimately, Baggini’s poorly argued book vindicates the call of contemporary Christian scholars. The church can powerfully answer its intellectual detractors and it’s time Christians commit to doing so.

Reply to Baggini (II)

Here is the second installment of my review of Julian Baggini's book, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction. Last time, I examined his arguments for naturalistic atheism. In this portion, I discuss his treatment of theistic ethics.

ATHEISM AND MORALITY

Baggini’s arguments for atheistic naturalism, thus, appear weak. I move next to his critique of theistic ethics. While he is certain that there are real moral imperatives (e.g., 'Murder is wrong'), he is equally sure that God is not their source. To show this, he poses the Euthyphro Dilemma: are certain actions good because God commands them, or does God command certain actions because they are good? Either way, theism faces difficulties. The first choice entails absurdly that God could command anything, including rape or murder, and it would be good. The second choice is similarly problematic, implying that God bases His commands on, but does not Himself determine, what is good.

But many theists circumvent these problems by adopting a third position wherein God’s moral commands are determined by His essentially good nature. With this, the dilemma dissolves: God does determine our moral law with His commands, but His commands cannot possibly be unethical as they flow necessarily from His morally perfect being.

Baggini objects, saying this too makes morality arbitrary, since rape or murder could have been good if God’s nature were different (39). But this is misleading, since God’s moral nature cannot possibly be different. Therefore, neither can morality itself, thus making it non-arbitrary.

He also contends that saying God is good in this sense implies that God fits our preconceived idea of goodness. But, allegedly, if we have moral concepts even prior to knowing God, then morality must not come from God (39). But Baggini here confuses knowing with being, as our ability to know morality without knowing God does nothing to indicate that morality can exist without God. Similarly, I can observe sunlight without observing the sun, but the latter still depends on the former for its existence.

A pertinent question arises: What does Baggini see as the foundation of morality? His answer: 'a basic concern for the welfare of others' based on our 'shared humanity' (46). Note just how arbitrary this is, implying that if humans happened to be morally unconcerned, then there would be no moral right or wrong! But let this pass. He is correct that our ethical systems should be built on the fact that humans deserve a special moral respect above that of other creatures. Ethicist Mark Linville explains that this 'is part and parcel of our most deep-seated moral beliefs.'9 Yet one never locates any explanation from Baggini of why other humans merit this respect. After all, on naturalism, he notes, 'a human being is a biological animal,' a mere survivor of the evolutionary struggle (17). But why then grant them a privileged moral status over the rest of the animal kingdom? Unlike Judeo-Christian theism, which holds that humans alone are made in God’s image and thereby reflect His inherent moral worth, evolutionary naturalism seems inconsistent with the moral principles we know to be true.

Reply to Baginni (I)

Julian Baggini is an atheistic British philosopher and a prolific writer. Though he holds a doctorate in philosophy, most of Baggini's work is aimed not at academics, but rather at bringing secularism to the popular masses. His recent book Atheism: A Very Short Introduction is in fact a prime of example of such evangelism.

I wrote a review of the book that was originally meant for the Christian Research Journal. Almost included, the editor decided to cut it, because of the book's lack of sales (allegedly, most readers would not have known the book and thus would not benefit from the review).

I include it here, since Baginni is a popular critic of Christianity and needs to be answered. I will break the review into about 4 separate posts. I skip the introduction and begin with my critique of his arguments for naturalism (i.e., the idea that nothing supernatural exists).

The Nature of Human Persons

Baggini opens his apologetic pondering human nature. Do humans have conscious, nonphysical minds that survive bodily death, as theists believe, or are we purely physical beings whose lives end at the grave, as naturalism implies?
Citing the regular correlation between brain activity and consciousness, he expectedly opts for the latter. Brain damage inhibits conscious activity; brain stimulation triggers it (18). Consciousness therefore apparently originates in the brain and, consequently, ends permanently upon brain death.

Unfortunately, Baggini appears unaware that theistic models of personhood easily explain and in fact predict this same correlation. Mind and brain are perhaps like seed and soil: mind is the source of mental life and the brain provides the physical environment allowing that source to flourish. Such models preserve the role of the mind as the root of mentality, but also account for the powerful effect of the brain on mental states.

Baggini says nothing against this account, accept that it seemingly undermines the afterlife: given this mind/brain interdependence, the mind must cease functioning upon brain death (30). But this is erroneous, since Christians believe God sustains the mind’s existence and functioning in the brain’s absence. And this continues until bodily resurrection.

Baggini, then, provides no good reason for disbelieving in nonphysical selves. In fact, he oddly ignores the best evidences for their existence5, one of these ironically being consciousness itself. Consciousness, as many scholars recognize, is a nonphysical property notoriously troublesome for a naturalist view of persons. Prominent naturalist philosopher, Paul Churchland is typical in announcing that, on his view, we cannot “fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter.”6 By contrast, if we have nonphysical minds, as Scripture attests, then our possession of nonphysical, mental properties is expected.

Induction and Explanation

Utilizing inductive logic and arguments to the best explanation, Baggini presents next a sampling of more briefly stated proofs of naturalism.

Induction. He characterizes induction as arguing, 'from what has been observed in the past and present to reach conclusions about what hasn’t been observed in the past, present, or future' (25). Thus, for example, since no one has ever seen a green cow, we conclude that probably no green cow has existed and none ever will.

There is strong inductive support for naturalistic atheism, says Baggini, for whenever we find an explanation of a certain phenomenon, it is a naturalistic one. So, 'the class of unexplained phenomena therefore is unlikely to contain anything that will come to be explained by anything supernatural' (27).

But clearly this begs the question: Why should anyone believe that all the explanations we know of are naturalistic? Theistic thinkers argue that divine activity explains myriad facts (the origin of the universe, the origin of life, etc.) and Baggini fails to present substantive objections to these claims.

The Universe. Baggini also writes that atheism gives the best explanation 'for why our world appears as it does' (28), his explanation being that the universe and all things in it are products of chance and scientific law.
Simplicity. He first contends that his account is better than a theistic one because, it is simpler. It requires us 'to posit only the existence of the natural world' (28), whereas theism requires the supernatural too.

This is partially correct: given rival explanations, those positing fewer entities are preferable. Thus, finding a small home that has been robbed, we infer that one or two persons committed the crime. Positing 20 criminals, though, would be extravagant.

Two problems arise, however. First, simpler hypotheses are preferred only if they are as good as their complex rivals. The question, then, is whether an allegedly simple naturalism can match theism’s explanatory success regarding the universe. Many philosophers find that it cannot.

Secondly, Baggini’s universe seems not at all simple. For despite rejecting the existence of immaterial substances (souls, deities), he accepts the reality of immaterial things like moral values, mental events, beauty, etc. Given this wide array of entities, why conclude that his world contains just one simple 'scheme of being' (29)? For Baggini, it is because, even these have physical, natural causes (6).

But such reasoning applies equally to the theist’s supernatural/natural distinction. Undoubtedly, these are separate realms, but this is irrelevant, since they have a common cause: God. Thus, the theist’s universe, like Baggini’s, contains one overarching category of being; namely, God-caused being, and theism is as simple as naturalism.


Coherence. Baggini’s rejection of materialism again haunts him when he contends that naturalism is more “coherent” than theism. He finds theism problematic in this sense, since there is apparently no way for the natural world to 'interact and co-exist' with the supernatural (29). But, while never detailing the actual problem here for theists, he has plenty of his own. For how or why his nonphysical realities exist in a fundamentally physical world is, as Churchland admits, wholly mysterious. On theism, though, features like beauty, mentality, and moral value are rooted in a God who displays these very traits and builds them into the universe. Baggini’s argument therefore backfires, as theism enjoys a coherence that naturalism lacks.

Religious Diversity. Baggini lastly looks at religious diversity, arguing that either all religion is a man-made fiction or there is only one true religion (29). Peculiarly, while he accepts the first option, he never justifies his choice. How does religious diversity imply that no religion is true? That conflicting perspectives exist on an issue does nothing to show that all such perspectives are mistaken.

God, Providence, and Ultimate Fighting

Fans of Ultimate Fighting (i.e., Mixed Martial Arts or MMA) will know that the most of the current beltholders in that sport are Christian believers. The list includes:

Wanderlei Silva, Pride Fighting Championship (Middleweight Champion)
Rich Franklin, UFC (Middleweight Champion)
Matt Hughes, UFC (Welterweight Champion)

These fighters make up 3 of the 5 major champions in pro MMA. In a recent interview, Silva cited his faith as the steadying force behind his four-year reign as a Pride FC champion. Hughes and Franklin similarly credit God for their in-ring success. Other MMA greats also claim Christianity: Randy Couture, Matt Lindland, Yuki Kondo, and Josh Barnett.

A peculiar question often ignored is, Why are Christians on top of this sport? Christians surely don't make up the bulk of fighters, since most are simply secular in their outlook. And obviously, the sport is not somehow more accessible to Christians in any form (probably just the opposite is true).

Upon reading the book of Psalms in the Old Testament, an interesting reply to this query might stare one in the face. For the Psalms were mainly penned by King David, the brilliant Israelite soldier and leader. And intriguingly, many of David's contributions contain requests of and thanksgiving to God for protection in battle, against enemies, and against strife. (Psalm 35 and Psalm 144 serve as examples.)

It seems evident that these prayers were not overlooked by God. Nowhere in history--Old Testament or otherwise--is it ever recorded that David suffered serious injury in battle. Nor did he die in battle despite his vast military experience.

Lesson learned: God often protects His followers against those trying to harm them. Could we, then, be seeing the same phenomenon in the world of MMA? God, in Scripture, offers His faithful people protection. It's unclear why MMA fighters wouldn't qualify.

My take on this issue will no doubt be questioned and scoffed at by some. But as a working hypothesis, I think it's interesting and plausible. As such, the status of Christians in MMA may just be further evidence that the God of the Bible is at work in our world.

New, Improved Young Earth Creationism

It is often alleged that anyone holding to a Young Earth Creationism (YEC) view of origins belongs with the crazies who study "Bigfoot" and UFOs.

YEC holds that the universe was created by God no more than 10,000 years ago and that this was done in a literal 7-day week. Its advocates believe this is what the Bible teaches and therefore must be true. Secular science and culture hardly appreciates this "outdated" stance.

Many Christians also disagree with YEC and believe standard theories that make the universe billions of years old. For them, the "days" in Genesis were not literal 24-hour days, but simply eons of time.

I'll let others argue about whose interpretation of Genesis is better. My point here is just that the YEC model is not as implausible as its critics claim.

This becomes evident when you examine the research of its scholars. Good books and papers have been published in this area in the past few years and even some of those unsympathetic to YEC are admitting so.

Kurt P. Wise, for instance, a Harvard Phd. and professor of paleontology at Bryan College provides some good, intriguing evidence for a young earth/global flood account of earth history. See his books Faith, Form, and Time and Something From Nothing. Wise and colleague Todd Wood have also advanced YEC with their study of "baraminology" or the classification of animals by their "created kind" at the Baraminology Study Group.

Other YEC geologists such as John Baumgardner and Andrew Snelling have also produced high quality work. They both contributed to the recent RATE book which examines in-depth the issue of radiometric dating and the claims of YEC.

Likewise, these and other YEC scientists recently completed a book about a YEC view of Grand Canyon geology. The book is well-written (and full of great photos) such that even ID proponent Phillip E. Johnson praised its scientific merits.

Philosopher John Mark Reynolds has lent credence to YEC in a recent essay. And he and many other scholars continue to contribute to the International Conference on Creationism.

The older YEC organizations (e.g., ICR and CRS) and journals (e.g., Creation Research Society Quarterly and TJ) have similarly progressed.

YEC can no longer be labeled a fringe group grasping a pipe dream. Rather, this is a model of origins that is growing both in size and stature. I'm personally agnostic between YEC and Old Earth Creationist views, but the old idea that YEC is equivalent to UFO research and the like has no basis in fact.

Is Satan a Snake?

In a certain sense, the answer to this question is an obvious "yes". We often call clever, manipulative, mean-spirited persons "snakes", because that's how the actual animal comes across to many of us (especially poisonous ones): sneaky and ready to kill us when we're not watching.

Thus, it seems natural for many of us to apply this label to certain evil people we know.

It's intersting when we examine the biblical account of Satan with this in mind. Everyone knows the story in Genesis 3 where Satan deceives Adam and Eve into rebelling and eating from the Tree of Knowledge. Here, Satan is said to be a serpent, "more crafty than any of the wild animals the Lord God had made" (Genesis 3:1).

In recent days, I've heard this passage addressed by Hank Hanegraaff, host of the terrific Bible Answer Man radio show. Hank is an expert in biblical interpretation and hermeneutics.

He takes what seems to me a very plausible view of this Genesis account. According to Hank, this was most probably not a case where a literal serpent spoke to Eve. Rather, Moses, who authored the account hundreds of years after the event, was using a literary device to highlight Satan's craftiness and evil. By the time Moses was writing, it was well-known what Satan was like and how his mission is to destroy human lives and separate them from God. Also known was just how sneaky and personal Satanic attacks could be on the human. (Satan and his demons can obviously affect the human mind, as witnessed in the Gospel accounts of various demonic possessions.)

Thus, Moses was most probably not implying that a real snake had duped Eve into eating the fruit. Instead, it was Satan attacking Eve's mind with all the subtlety that he uses against all humans (subtelty characteristic of a poisonous viper).

This seems like an excellent interpretation to me on several grounds. First, the Bible uses metaphors for Satan throughout. He's called a beast, a roaring lion, and a serpent in various places. But these passages are obviously not meant to say that Satan really takes the form of an animal. Satan simply has qualities that remind of us of these creatures. So, it's not surprising that Genesis 3 does the same. Secondly, this view highlights the way in which Satan often deceives mankind--by attacking their mind, influencing their thinking when they least expect it. Knowing this can again remind Christians to guard against his careful attacks. Thirdly, it gives a plausible answer to skeptics who find the story inherently implausible and folktale-like because its use of talking animals (though even if Moses was saying the snake really spoke, I think the story could be defended plausibly).

Next time you think about Satan and his forces, use Genesis 3 as a wakeup call to guard against the subtelty he used to plunge the human race into sin and devastation.

Atheism: Justified By Faith?

This is an article of mine recently published in Christian Research Journal (an excellent Christian magazine I recommend to everyone). It's a review of the fine book, I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist by Norman Geisler and Frank Turek. Two thumbs WAY up.

Philosopher J.P. Moreland has observed that secularism is primarily a theory of knowledge: only what can be examined in the laboratory or by the five senses is knowable. Since God cannot, presumably, be detected by either, secular America finds biblical faith more akin to wishful thinking than to real knowlede.

Readers of Norman Geisler and Frank Turek's I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist will recognize the self-defeating nature of such claims. Ironically, the authors note, this theory of knowledge cannot itself be verified through science or sense perception (pp. 127-28). It is like the spoken sentence, "I can't speak a word of English"; once one claims it true, he proves it false.

Perhaps, then, the door to theological knowledge is not closed after all. Renowned apologist Geisler, and Turek, his accomplished student, throw the door wide open by teaching readers not only how to recognize self-defeating assertions, but also how to develop their own case for Christianity.

They open with evidence of monotheism, including thorough defenses of the cosmological, design, and moral arguments; however, it will take a miracle--literally--to turn this bare-bones theism into a Christian one. Jesus' resurrection, for example, confirms His claims and thus vindicates Christianity specifically (not Islam or Judaism). The authors readily refute objections to the possibility of miracles and our ability to recognize them.

In chapters 9-12, perhaps the most powerful in the book, Geisler and Turek answer the question of whether miracles have actually occurred by demonstrating the authenticity of the New Testament testimony about Jesus' resurrection. The highlight is the innovative chapter 11, which presents the "Top Ten Reasons" for accepting the New Testament as history; for example, if the New Testament authors were fiction writers, why create a demanding Jesus who offended many first-century reader (279-80)?

In the final two chapters, the authors explain what Jesus taught about His own divinity and present a defense of the Bible's divine origin. The book concludes with appendices on evil, relativism, and the Jesus Seminar. The first is especially good. It is a hypothetical dialogue between a Christian and atheist that provides sophisticated answers to questions such as why God allowed 9/11.

This book targets a diverse readership. Some chapters, such as those establishing monotheism, will most benefit newcomers to apologetics. Others, such as those defending the New Testament, provide a summary of the evidence that is helpful to even seasoned apologists.

The authors do make some controversial assertions. They claim God is timeless (197), although some Christian thinkers such as William Lane Craig and Richard Swinburne hold that God is in time. They also assert that the reality of time requires the reality of space (84); however Craig and others argue that these can exist independently.

I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, nevertheless, remains brilliant. Moreover, frequent insertions of humor and stories of personal apologetic encounters prevent the text from becoming dry and detached, making it an appealing read for believers and atheists.

5 Reasons MMA is the Best Sport

Roughly, a sport is an extraordinary physical activity done in competition with others. "Extraordinary" meaning (roughly) at least minimally strenuous. Playing cards, therefore, does not qualify as a sport. Golf and bowling do qualify.

Mixed Martial Arts (MMA)is a sport which combines various fighting techniques (each sports of their own) to see which, of two competitors, can defeat the other by knockout or submission.

But not only is it a sport, I think it's the best sport of all. Why?

1) MMA athletes are the most dedicated in the world. They have no offseason in which to relax. Their fights occur year-round and therefore they train year-round. Secondly, fighters constantly fight injured. Boxing, wrestling, and ground-fighting in practice makes injuries inevitable. However, most fights can't be missed or else the paycheck will be missed. Fighting with injury is routine.

2) MMA fighters have the broadest skill set. Most athletes master one sport--basketball, golf, hockey. Few have mastered multiple sports--boxing, muay thai, jiu jitsu, like MMA guys have.

3) MMA has practical application. MMA athletes must be excellent fighters. If you're a pro in MMA you're guaranteed to be highly-qualified in self-defense on the street. Basketball and football skills do little for real life.

4) MMA athletes are typically good sportsmen. Unlike many NBA, MLB, and NFL players, they generally respect each other before and after their fights.

5) As mentioned in #1, there is no offseason in MMA. Entertaining events occur all year.

There you have it: 5 solid reasons for preferring MMA. Check it out.

Taking on Michael Martin

Anyone seeking to defend atheism with the best arguments available will inevitably run into the work of atheist philosopher Michael Martin at some point. Martin is a Harvard Phd. who specializes in philosophy of religion and has published numerous books and articles in that area.

When I first began studying apologetics I discovered Martin's writings and found them to be challenging and thoughtful. In my opinion, he was (and possibly still is) probably the strongest opponent of Christianity currently writing. His works include the books *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification* and *The Case Against Christianity*.

As I've grown in my reading and abilities in apologetics, however, I've come to see Martin's arguments as far less impressive than I originally thought. Many of his arguments against theism, I think, are weak, as are his attempted rebuttals to the historical arguments for Jesus's Resurrection from the dead (see his *The Case Against Christianity* on this).

This change in opinion has been highlighted by recent evangelical philosophers who have dueled with Martin on various topics. Philosophers like Paul Copan and Stephen T. Davis are probably Martin's greatest professional rivals today. They have critiqued (I think very successfully) many of Martin's positions.

Following their lead, I've taken on Martin myself. My article "Michael Martin on Divine Omniscience" addresses Martin's arguments against the concept of God and was published in Think, a British philosophy journal. I also published an online article responding to Martin's arguments against Heaven. His own response to me is found here.

Needless to say, I think Christians have done an effective job dismantling Martin's attacks on Christian theism.

Fighting, Christian Style

"Contend, O Lord, with those who contend with me; fight against those who fight against me." (Psalm 35:1)

To the surprise of those who know me, my favorite sport continues to be Mixed Martial Arts (MMA). Also known as "Ultimate Fighting", this is a sport known for its tenacity and for the toughness and courage of its competitors. Think of a fighting style and MMA includes it--wrestling, kickboxing, jiu jistu, muay thai. Master this sport and no one can touch you. Master this sport, and you truly are the Ultimate Fighter.

Also surprising is MMA's relation to my Christian faith. As an evangelical Christian, I have well-defined beliefs: God exists, Christ is divine, the Bible is God's inerrant Word, etc. Also, as an evangelical, my beliefs come under consistent attack in the secular culture. Evolutionists, liberals, atheists all look to tear down historic Christianity. "Evolution trumps creation." "The Bible isn't historical." "God doesn't exist." Or such are their claims.

Like the Ultimate Fighter, then, a Christian dedicated to defending his faith must dabble in varied disciplines: philosophy, history, science. "Christian apologetics" (i.e., the task of defending Christianity's truth), then, is Christianity's MMA.

The quote at the top of this post comes from King David, the Psalmist. A renowned warrior and Israelite leader, David was one of the bravest followers of God in the entire Bible. Apologists (those who do Christian apologetics) do well to seek His request of God as they fight the secular criticisms.

And it is to that task I dedicate this blog (with some posts about MMA along the way, of course). Most Christian laymen in today's church know little about apologetics, despite the great apologetic tradition the church boasts (greats like Augustine, Aquinas, Craig, and Geisler come to mind). Luckily, I'm not one of them, as I've studied the subject since 1998. It's time to take the message to the masses.

Let the battles begin.